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Abstract:
Bellingham Bay is a rich environment that has been appreciated by geologists, 
geographers, biologists as well as other academics from the natural sciences.  This thesis 
highlights many of these scholarly approaches, but adds a human element to the history  
of this harbor.  Special attention is paid to the underwater landscape of the Bay because 
different groups of people have tried to control this feature of the Bay and embed various 
social constructions into the physical geography.  More importantly, differing ideas about 
the Bay and how it should be managed and altered have brought different groups into 
conflict.  These conflicts make up the bulk of this interpretation.  I argue that social 
scientists have failed to appreciate the relationship between human history and the natural 
environments below the surface of coastal areas.
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Introduction
In 1946, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) hosted an important public 
meeting in the City of Bellingham, Washington.  The purpose of this gathering was to 
garner the views of county residents and local business representatives regarding the 
prospects of redeveloping the bodies of water adjacent to the city.  Many in attendance, 
like Nick Costanti, a representative of the Fishing Boat Owners Association, complained 
that the decades old harbor strategy, which was meant to promote economic development
through commercial shipping, had run its course.  Furthermore, many in attendance 
pressed the Corps to adopt a new plan for economic development—one that would 
supplant the commercial interests that had long held sway over harbor management and 
development—in favor of promoting the region’s nascent recreational boating industry 
and commercial fishery.  To this end, they vigorously argued that the community lacked 
and direly needed safe moorage for the many small vessels that were visiting Bellingham 
Bay in increasing numbers.  A consequence of this plan was that the waterfront would 
need to be redeveloped such that it would compromise the ability for shippers to use the 
deep draft entryways to the inner harbor that had been improved and assiduously 
protected in prior decades.  
Knowingly or not, the attendees were participating in a lengthy historical struggle 
over the meaning of the Bay and how its underwater landscape should be managed and 
re-shaped.  For instance, meetings about the Bay, like the one in 1946, were somewhat 
regular occurrences during the first half of the twentieth century.  The United States
Army Corps of Engineers often met with Bellingham residents to discuss and debate how 
the waterfront and, especially, the underwater landscape of Bellingham Bay should be 
2managed and reshaped.  Topics that were routinely discussed involved how deep the Bay 
should be dredged and whether or not the Nooksack River, the principle tributary of the 
Bay, should be diverted into Lummi Bay (a waterway that resides to the northwest of 
Bellingham Bay) in order to mitigate the accumulation of sedimentation in the harbor—
silt was a major problem for commercial pilots when it shallowed sea-lanes.  
Furthermore, many of these meetings were held to discuss the possibility of 
creating a harbor that could help grow the regional economy.  For instance, federal and 
local officials long envisioned that the Bay could be transformed to benefit waterborne 
commerce, chiefly deep draft shipping.  As early as the 1850s, federal officials had taken 
a keen interest in the seafloor of Bellingham Bay and whether it was sufficiently deep to 
warrant developing the harbor into a modern transportation hub.  In subsequent years, 
many more government agents, mostly engineers of the Corps, would come and inspect 
the Bay for similar reasons.  Their visits and reports helped convince Congress that 
federal funds would be well spent on dredging schemes that benefited large commercial 
vessels.  Later, as the non-Native community of Bellingham Bay grew over time, federal 
officials allowed these new residents to be a part of the planning and implementation of 
deep draft harbor improvements.      
However, the meeting in 1946 was different.  Instead of recommending further 
deep draft improvements, the attendees argued for improving the Bay so that it could 
cater to the interests of small-boat owners.  In the coming years, when these 
recommendations were carried out, the character of the Bay changed.  Deep draft 
3Figure 1:
This aerial representation depicts many of the features of Bellingham Bay that will be discussed in this 
essay.  At the top of the picture is the Nooksack Delta.  The elbow at the right of the picture is the original 
Anglo settlement of the 1850s that is now the central downtown business district and port of Bellingham. 
Towards the right and lower right is the Fairhaven district and Chuckanut Bay, respectively.  The opening 
at the bottom of the picture leads to Samish Bay and Puget Sound, while the passage at the left opens up to 
Lummi Bay and the Strait of Georgia.  This digitally photographed map was reproduced with the 
permission of Wade Campbell of Darvill’s Rare Prints, www.DarvillsRarePrints.com.
commercial shipping interests, which had dominated public discussions in the past, 
became marginalized and subsequently lost their ability to demand that the Bay be 
improved and managed for their needs before the needs of others.  A particularly 
important year for this shift in power was 1952; it was when the Corps, which had long 
championed deep draft commercial improvements, made a striking about-face and 
assented to the construction of the small boat basin that residents asked for in 1946.  
Shipping interests gained nothing from this basin because it was constructed along parts 
of the waterfront that had formerly been developed into a port terminal and turning basin
that were specifically built to match up with dredged underwater channels—thus a small-
4boat basin would cause considerable harm to commercial shippers.  It was also in 1952 
that the once deepened portions of the Bay had filled with sediments to the extent that it 
had caused havoc for shipping companies and their pilots.  The Corps and the Port of 
Bellingham had often received complaints about the depth of the harbor from shipping 
interests ever since the Bay was first improved at the turn-of-the-century.  But in this 
particular year, Alex Halstead, of the association the Puget Sound Pilots, signaled to the 
Port of Bellingham and the Corps that shipping companies had had enough and 
threatened to stay away from Bellingham Bay.  But these concerns were not addressed by 
the Corps since the latter would not even agree to the simple request that a public meeting 
be held to discuss the unease of commercial shippers.  Ever since 1952, Bellingham Bay 
has, as a result, become identified more as a destination place for small boats—
particularly pleasure boats—than as a harbor for deep draft shippers.
Bellingham Bay, like other coastal marine environments, is a dynamic feature of 
nature that has long been appreciated by biologists, geographers and geologists.  This 
thesis, however, will endeavor to showcase the equally interesting human relationship 
with the landscape of Bellingham Bay in the past.  The shifting dynamic between 
shipping and small-boat interests is an example of a larger story about how different 
people have encountered, thought about and ultimately changed the Bay to suit different 
needs.  Moreover, as diverse peoples formed ideas about the Bay, some obtained more 
power than others to manage and change this harbor.  This thesis is ultimately about the 
formation of marine environmental thought and about who had the power to embed their 
ideas about nature into the landscape of the Bay, primarily its underwater landscape. 
5Different individuals and cultures have encountered the Bay in the past—such as 
Natives Americans, European explorers, and Euro-Americans settlers—but not all of 
these people have understood the nature of the Bay similarly.  Even people from like
backgrounds have had wildly different understandings of the harbor.  For example, when 
federal railroad surveyors first approached the Bay in the 1850s, they saw a feature of 
nature that could help connect the nation by acting as a railroad terminus.  Later, when 
the big railroad companies fell out of favor with the government, federal officials saw a 
drastically different purpose for the harbor: Congress and the Corps hoped that the harbor 
would help combat rising freight rates and, by extension, tame the powerful railroad 
companies.  Nowadays, the meaning of the Bay has changed yet again for much of the 
community.  It is now widely viewed first and foremost as a place for recreational boaters 
and maturing salmon.  While many have encountered Bellingham Bay, they have often 
formed drastically different ideas about this harbor’s most innate function. (See figures 
two and three)  
This thesis is not necessarily meant to catalog all of the ways that people have 
encountered and conceived of marine environments like Bellingham Bay in the past.  
Instead it is about how different social constructions of nature brought people into 
quarrel.  Differences were more prone to occur when people tried to embed their 
respective ideas about nature onto the landscape of the Bay.  Humans have changed the 
Bay a great deal since arriving to the region; it has been altered so extensively through 
dredging, landfilling and human-induced sedimentation that it should be thought of as a 
hybrid landscape—a term that environmental historians have increasingly adopted to talk 
6Figure 2:
This is typical of contemporary visual representations of Bellingham Bay.  Note the lack of human 
presence in the actual Bay itself.  “Islands.” Credit: photo by Melinee Fischer, courtesy of the City of 
Bellingham.
Figure 3:
This sketch, when contrasted with figure two, reveals that past residents of Bellingham Bay had 
entirely different conceptions of their Bay.  Instead of the placid waters that are seemingly free of 
a human presence, we have a Bay that is viewed as needing intensive development through 
landfilling and dredging.  While many of the projects in this blueprint were never completed, it 
shows that some saw the Bay in completely different ways.  (See note 133 for full citation).
7about environments that blur the boundaries between pristine and built environments.  
These alterations, at least those that were made intentionally, were made so that the Bay 
better represented the meaning that people had given it.  For instance, as the Corps and 
the Port of Bellingham envisioned a harbor for the service and protection of large vessels, 
they set to work dredging deep and long channels that allowed ships to enter the shallow 
tidelands and remain docked at the shoreline during all tides.  But the Corps 
improvements did not mesh with the ways that others had both conceived of and altered 
the Bay.  For example, during the early part of the century, the Corps was constantly 
troubled by local timber companies because the latter were producing vast amounts of 
sawdust and other refuse that mill managers disposed into the same waters that engineers 
were endeavoring to deepen.  For mill owners, the meaning of the Bay was different; it 
was a convenient dumping ground in addition to a waterway for large boats.
As might be expected, ideas about the Bay that were mutually exclusive did not 
lead to an anarchic scenario whereby anyone was allowed to shape, manage and/or use 
the Bay as he or she chose.  Instead, clear winners and losers emerged from these 
competing visions and uses of the Bay.  For instance, when dumping and shipping 
interests clashed, the latter emerged victorious.  Congress accomplished this through the 
creation of anti-obstruction laws that outlawed navigational impediments, which the 
Corps then enforced at Bellingham Bay.  For half a century, the Corps acted as a 
watchdog over the harbor, to the consternation of those who saw its value, for example, 
as a dump.
8The Bay needs to be credited as a catalyst for changing environmental ideas as 
well.  While its landscape was being changed by the likes of Corps engineers, Bellingham 
Bay was not at all conducive to some of their landscape schemes.  Though the Bay lacks 
the volition that historians generally subscribe to human actors, it was by no means an 
unchanging and irrelevant backdrop to the regional history.  For instance, the Bay left its 
mark on European explorers.  Early non-Native visitors found the Bay attractive because 
it was a place of tranquility compared to the more precarious waters of the Puget Sound.  
As a result, Corps engineers sought to build upon these natural qualities and make it into 
a viable harbor.  But Bellingham Bay was not static and it would not allow humans to 
easily simplify its landscape for commercial shippers.  Fluctuating sedimentation was the 
most important factor that confounded their efforts to maintain proper depths.  Over time, 
commercial pilots were less willing to utilize the Bay’s improved features out of fear that 
their ships would run aground or be forced to vacate the harbor during low tides because 
of insufficient depths.  By the mid-twentieth century, sedimentation (and the problems 
that it brought about) would open the door for new ways of thinking about the Bay after 
the efficacy of deep draft shipping had faded from the minds of local and national 
observers.  Yet at the same time that commercial shippers realized that Bay
improvements were a failure, many found this changing landscape to be a boon, 
particularly for recreational boaters and commercial fishermen who saw the shallow 
waters of the Bay as an opportunity for easy anchorage, rather than a deterrent.  As a 
consequence, they then attempted to seize power over harbor management.
9While ideas about the Bay have changed, one thing has remained constant: it is an 
environment that people have often fought to control and shape so that its underwater 
landscape fits their ideas about a harbor and its proper function.  This thesis will endeavor 
to explore the relationship between a particular type of coastal marine environment and 
its human occupants—a historical relationship that has largely been ignored by historians.      
This thesis fits most explicitly into the body of research that has been conducted by 
environmental historians.  In the past two decades or so this subfield has come into its 
own.  Its maturity is evident, as one scholar has argued, not only with its growing body of 
literature, but because its practitioners have increasingly come into disagreement with 
one another—a sign of health and maturity in the development of an academic field.1    
Despite these advances, comparatively few historians have looked beyond 
terrestrial environments and interpreted human relationships with marine environments 
and their biota.  Historian W. Jeffery Bolster has been most outspoken about this 
shortcoming.  In his 2006 article published in the journal Environmental History, Bolster 
points out that the prominent environmental historians Carolyn Merchant and Theodore 
Steinberg had both ignored any treatment of the ocean in their recent synthetic works on 
American environmental history.  Furthermore, they did not suggest that their books were 
in any way lacking; “neither book,” writes Bolster, “explains that it covers only terrestrial 
environmental history, and that complementary marine histories are waiting to be told.”2
                                                
1. Mart A. Stewart, “Environmental History: Profile of a Developing Field,” The History Teacher 
31, no. 3 (May 1998): 353. 
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According to Bolster, this indifference to the ocean is nothing new.  Many 
scholars, ranging from Baron du Montesquieu to Rachael Carson, have failed to think 
critically about the relationship between humans and the sea, a failing that is the result of 
longstanding cultural assumptions about the ocean.  Scholars have long been tempted to 
think about marine environments through the lenses of popular cultural tropes that cast 
these waters as “timeless” and “unchangeable.”  As a result of its perceived 
changelessness, social scientists have not considered the ways that humans have 
historically interacted with the sea; nor have they thought critically about how they have 
represented marine nature.3
But in the last few decades these older assumptions about the ocean have been 
challenged.  Commercial fishery failures and scientific studies have revealed that 
dramatic declines in sea life have occurred and that the oceans of the world have become 
increasingly polluted.  These findings have also generated the belief among modern 
scientists that the ocean is not as unchangeable as once thought.  Furthermore, popular 
media sources, such as Newsweek, have made the public more aware of the state of the 
ocean.  The Newfoundland cod fishery collapse and the “death” of the Black Sea (as the 
result of a non-native jellyfish) became widely known, leading many to consider that the 
changes in the ocean are new phenomena.4  Consumer habits reflected the popular 
                                                                                                                                                
2. W. Jeffrey Bolster, “Opportunities in Marine Environmental History,” Environmental History
11, no. 3 (July 2006): 576.
3. Barry Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean: The Atlantic and Its Peoples 8000 BC-AD 1500 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); Vincent H. Cassidy, The Sea Around Them: The Atlantic Ocean, A.D. 
1250 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968). Bolster points to the preceding works as 
suffering from this lack imagination;  Bolster, “Opportunities in Marine Environmental History,” 572-575.  
Bolster lists and quotes the many important scholars who have considered the ocean timeless.  
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dissemination of scientific studies as consumers began demanding, for example,
“sustainably” certified products out of concern for the state of the world’s fisheries.5
But Bolster recommends that environmental historians think critically about the 
emergence of this “chilling meta-narrative,” as he terms it, and whether the human 
impact on the ocean is truly a recent phenomenon.  As cultural assumptions about the 
ocean allow for people to think about the ocean as part of human history, environmental 
historians should try to rethink the history of this relationship in order to determine its 
true length and extent.  Historical scholarship may reveal that the environmental crises 
that appear to be “recent” and “sudden” may actually be part of longer historical 
processes.  To underscore the opportunities of this pursuit, Bolster discusses an 
alternative interpretation of the history of the failing Newfoundland cod fishery that has 
garnered so much attention in the last twenty years.  This argument held that the failed 
fishery had actually been enlarged by humans several centuries ago after intensive 
whaling freed up large amounts of biomass for other species, such as cod, to feed on and 
increase in numbers.  Drawing on this example, Bolster believes that there is potential for 
historians to write environmental histories that catalog the longer and more complex 
relationship between humans and the sea that will complicate the notion that the human 
impact on the ocean is a recent development.6
                                                                                                                                                
4. Bolster, “Opportunities in Marine Environmental History.”
5. David Suzuki and Faisal Moola, “Consumer Demand Spur a Corporate Sea Change,” 
GreenNexxus, http://www.greennexxus.com/post/2009/06/Consumer-demand-spurs-a-corporate-sea-
change.aspx (accessed November 25, 2009).
6. Bolster, “Opportunities in Marine Environmental History,” 569, 570. 
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While Bolster has demonstrated that marine environmental histories are both 
needed and possible, there are other ways of researching and thinking about non-
terrestrial environments than simply reconstructing historical fisheries (he hints at some 
of these in his article, but fails to develop these sorts of historical opportunities).  
Geographer Philip Steinberg has for example looked at the history of cultural 
representations of marine environments.  His book, The Social Construction of the 
Ocean, moves towards an explanation of why marine environments have been viewed for 
so long as a “great void,” as he calls it, and portrayed as absent a human history.  
Steinberg correlates changes in the modern capitalist world-system with cultural 
representations of the ocean to determine that general trends in the former—such as 
periods of capital fixity and capital circulation—have affected how marine environments 
are conceived of by western cultures.  During the mercantilist era, for instance, Steinberg 
argues that cultural representations often depict the ocean as a social environment.  This 
observation correlates with the commercial and territorial aspects of capitalist nations 
during that time, which carved up and divided the ocean up into sea lanes.  But later 
during the industrial era, he explains that cultural representations are overwhelmingly 
asocial and that the ocean is depicted as a dangerous and morally deprave space.  These 
portrayals, according to Steinberg, correlate with a period of capitalism that was intent on 
fixed investment in place (i.e. factories).  Because the ocean was largely undevelopable in 
this regard, Steinberg believes that the ocean has increasingly become conceived of as a 
great void, absent a history that overlaps with humanity in any considerable way.7
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But Steinberg’s approach to interpreting the ocean is problematic because he 
treats the oceans of the world as though they are homogenous environments when in fact 
they can be quite heterogeneous.  Coastal environments, such as bays, provide a contrast 
to Steinberg’s generalizing treatment of marine nature.  This history of Bellingham Bay 
will demonstrate that coastal environments were seen quite differently than the open 
ocean, especially during the industrial era of capitalist expansion.  These types of 
environments were not feared or viewed as wild places, but seen as environments that 
could be developed in interesting and dramatic ways.
In general, Steinberg’s ill consideration of coastal environments is nothing new.  
Coastal features of nature have, according to historian Connie Chiang, been skipped over 
by environmental historians as well.8  This is surprising since the seaboard is a place 
where huge populations of people reside and interact with often dynamic marine 
ecosystems.  Urban environmental historians, for instance, have been in a good position 
to explore marine environmental histories, but unfortunately few of them have dared get 
their feet too wet.  Matthew Klingle’s environmental history of the City of Seattle is a 
good example.  Klingle offers a compelling and extremely nuanced interpretation of the 
relationship between Seattle’s diverse environments and cultures which enables him to 
conclude that “[f]rom the crest of the Cascades to the shores of Puget Sound, the waters 
and lands that encompassed the region were neither fully natural nor completely artificial, 
                                                                                                                                                
7. Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
8. Connie Chiang, Shaping the Shoreline: Fisheries and Tourism on the Monterrey Coast (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2008), 6; Daniel L. Boxberger, To Fish in Common: The Ethnohistory of 
Lummi Indian Salmon Fishing (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). For an even more local 
example of this see Boxberger’s interpretation of the relationship between Native and non-Native fishers.
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but a fusion of the two.”9  But in spite of this, Klingle has surprisingly little to say about 
the human relationship with nature beyond the waterfront.  When he writes about the 
Elliot Bay at all, he comes close to pure declension when he discusses how its waters 
were polluted and, more importantly, when its tidelands were filled and stripped of their 
communal ownership in favor of private ownership.  In general, the further Klingle drifts 
away from the shoreline, the murkier his interpretation gets.     
Historian Matthew Booker’s research on San Francisco Bay, though better, also 
suffers from this same general fault.  His history of the tidelands takes the reader further 
from the high tide line and offers a fuller history of the human relationship with the Bay 
than Klingle does.  Like Klingle, Booker discusses how the tidelands, which were once 
communal, became private property.  But Booker goes further by discussing how the Bay 
was successfully cultivated by oyster farmers who brought non-native species to its 
waters—an industry that lasted until the waters became polluted by other industries.  
However, Booker fails from the same lack of imagination as Klingle because he is 
generally only interested in the parts of San Francisco Bay that are dry from time to time 
during the day.10
Historians who are more socially orientated have done a better job at detailing the 
human activities that took place away from the shoreline.  Chiang, for instance, has 
examined the social dynamic of a marine environment that was carved up and known 
                                                
9. Klingle, Emerald City, 249.
10. Matthew Morse Booker, “Oyster Growers and Oyster Pirates in San Francisco Bay,” Pacific 
Historical Review 75, no. 1 (February 2006): 63-88; Matthew Morse Booker, “Real Estate and Refuge: An 
Environmental History of San Francisco Bay’s Tidal Wetlands, 1846-1972,” (PhD diss., Stanford 
University, 2005). 
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through racial lenses.  In her history of Monterrey Bay, Chiang has shown that as the 
marine waters were fished by increasingly polyglot fishermen, racial tensions rose.  Some 
tried to assert more power over the waters of Monterrey Bay by claiming that others were 
using fishing tactics that were harmful to catches.  Because ethnicity often influenced the 
choice of fishing gear, these arguments were thinly veiled, and sometimes outright, racial 
attacks used by Anglo fishers to exclude those ethnic groups that they found undesirable
by Anglos from the waters of the Bay.11  But beyond Chiang’s work in reconstructing the 
important human geography of power relationships that took place in marine waters, she 
tends to dismiss how the physical geography of the harbor has played a part in this 
history.
The attention that Klingle, Booker and Chiang (among others) have given to the 
waterfront in recent years has been illuminating.  But have they privileged the terrestrial 
aspects of the coastal environments that they explored at the expense of the underwater 
landscape?  Furthermore, is the physical geography that we cannot see even of the 
province of an environmental historian?  This thesis is intended to show that this 
underwater landscape is indeed important and relevant to the field.  Coastal underwater 
landscapes are middle grounds; they are not quite like the open ocean and not quite like 
terrestrial coastal lands.  Yet underwater coastal landscapes share commonalities with the 
open ocean and the coast, and thus need to be appreciated with reference to both.  
A recent study of Boston Harbor by historian Michael Rawson provides an 
overdue exception to the general lack of consideration that historians have paid certain 
                                                
11. Chiang, Shaping the Shoreline, 53.
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aspects of coastal landscapes, particularly the environments that are submerged and thus 
out of sight.  According to Rawson, nineteenth century Bostonians were very concerned 
about protecting their naturally deep harbor from filling with sediments because they
considered this underwater landscape to be vital to their city.  Many saw landfilling along 
the shoreline as a major problem for the harbor because they thought that shrinking 
channels would inhibit a tidal scour effect that they believed was keeping the harbor from 
shoaling.  Although this theory was later discredited, it shaped where landfill proponents 
were able to create new shorelines for much of the nineteenth century, and was the cause 
for heated debates between landfill and navigational proponents.  Rawson’s study of 
Boston Harbor is not only groundbreaking, it provides a model for both urban and 
environmental historians interested in pushing their scope beyond terrestrial 
environments.12   
This study of Bellingham Bay has some unique traits that build on Rawson’s 
study.  For example, Bellingham residents managed their harbor as had Bostonians.  But 
the former inherited a feature of nature that was not at all conducive to the types of 
activities that they intended for it to serve.  In other words, Bostonians were protecting 
their harbor while Bellingham residents were protecting a harbor that they had helped 
construct.  Additionally, my study focuses on the creation and implementation of law to 
manage the Bay, whereas Rawson was concerned with scientific understanding of marine 
environments and how it translated into harbor management strategies.  But most 
importantly, this history of Bellingham Bay will provide another example that points to 
                                                
12. Michael Rawson, “What Lies Beneath: Science, Nature, and the Making of Boston Harbor,” 
Journal of Urban History 35, no. 5 (July 2009): 675-697. 
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the ways that humans thought carefully about and fought over an unseen marine 
landscape.  
This essay is also intended to build upon local histories.  Unfortunately there are fewer of 
them to discuss.  One important exception is Daniel Boxberger’s impressive history of 
the underdevelopment of the Lummi Native fishery.  Boxberger demonstrates that while 
the Lummi may have occupied the shoreline of Bellingham Bay with non-Natives, they 
did not receive an equal share of the natural resources of the Bay.  The Lummi were 
never big players in the early years of the commercial salmon fishery, in spite of their 
being a primarily fishing people.  Boxberger found this peculiar since the Lummi were 
noted for their technologically diverse fishing tactics and their knowledge of salmon runs.  
He reasoned that their knowledge of fishing should have placed them in a great position 
to benefit from this exploding turn-of-the-century industry.  Boxberger explains this 
paradox away by demonstrating that the Lummi commercial fishery was actively 
underdeveloped by non-Natives during the course of the twentieth century.  Race was an 
important factor that Boxberger utilizes to explain why the Lummi fishery was never on 
par with non-Native commercial fishing.  Cannery owners, for example, did not hire 
Natives as laborers and avoided receiving Native catches.  These reasons, among others, 
inhibited the Lummi from profiting during the heyday of commercial salmon fishing.13
For the purpose of this essay, Boxberger does the work of demonstrating how and 
why the Lummi Nation was marginalized politically and economically.  Their marginal 
                                                
13. Boxberger, To Fish in Common.  
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status is a likely reason why they rarely show up in the sources relative to the harbor
improvements of the early twentieth century that will be discussed at length later in these 
pages.  Although the Lummi played little part in these improvements, their absence in the 
pages of this thesis is not meant to ignore their history.  In fact, their absence should 
suggest quite the opposite.  It should underscore how power was distributed unevenly 
amongst Bay residents, and not simply regarding fisheries.  Fortunately, this dynamic is 
shifting, and the Lummi are becoming more important actors in the current 
redevelopment of Bellingham’s waterfront, which is discussed more fully in the 
conclusion.  Presently they are playing a role, for instance, by offering suggestions and 
criticism of the current redevelopment scheme being developed by Port and City of 
Bellingham.  Recently, the Port went so far as to hire an outside mediator to aid in 
reconciling the problems that the Lummi Nation have with waterfront development 
proposals, which suggests that the concerns of the Lummi are necessary if the project is 
to be successful.14  
Historian Beth Kraig’s work on the Bellingham Bay Improvement Company 
(BBIC) is also worth mentioning.  Kraig sought to interpret the intentions of the BBIC; 
that is, whether the company was a “boomer” or “booster.”  In the late nineteenth century 
the American West was both urbanizing and industrializing.  In order to capitalize on 
these trends many smaller cities and towns welcomed distant investors into their 
communities.  Investors with genuine interests in developing a city with their capital were 
called boosters, while other investors turned out to be less sanguine.  Boomers, as the 
                                                
14. John Stark, “Port Hires Waldo to Mediate on Waterfront Issues—Attorney was the Point Man 
Tribes Preferred,” Bellingham Herald, February 6, 2008.
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latter were called, sold lofty dreams of making a community into a metropolis only to 
cut-and-run with sizeable profits after inciting speculation, typically in land.  Despite 
Kraig’s conclusion that the community of Bellingham was ultimately disappointed with 
the BBIC (particularly owing to the BBIC’s inability to secure a railroad terminus), Kraig 
interprets the intentions of the company as genuinely booster-like.  According to Kraig, 
the corporation was not run by “con men”—although the owners ultimately became rich, 
their profits were not derived from speculative investments in the City of Bellingham.15  
While Kraig has thoughtfully considered the history of the BBIC in the context of 
larger social changes occurring contemporaneously, her work tends to overemphasize the 
role of this company as the sole provider of capital for the city.  In this essay, I will 
demonstrate that the community had other opportunities available for developing their 
city.  Like many other regions of the West, the City of Bellingham was not entirely “self-
made”; that is, it was not entirely carved out of the forest through the ingenuity and hard 
work of Anglo-American migrants.16  The residents of Bellingham found the federal 
government an important source of capital for economic development in addition to 
private capital.  When it came to Bellingham Bay, the community, and even the BBIC, 
endeavored to convince Congress and the Corps that the federal tax dollars would be well 
invested in harbor improvements.
                                                
15. Beth Kraig, “The Bellingham Bay Improvement Company: Boomers or Boosters?” Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly 80, no. 4 (October 1989): 122-132; Beth Kraig, “A Slow Game: The Bellingham Bay 
Improvement Company and the Economic Development of Bellingham, 1900-1912,” (master’s thesis, 
Western Washington University, 1981). 
16. Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the West
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 57-59. According to White, the federal government shaped 
the history more than is often assumed.  The historical change of the West is typically associated with the 
multitude of individualistic and self-reliant Anglo-American migrant.  
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Chapter one will examine some of the earliest written records of human encounters with 
the Bay.  Preceding these encounters will be a general description of the various 
historical environments.  Special attention will be given to the difficulties that early 
explorers described when they experienced the Bay as well as the general meaning with 
which it was consequently endowed.
Chapter two will discuss how ideas about the Bay, which had begun forming 
during the late nineteenth century, were applied to the landscape of the Bay.  Also, this 
chapter will discuss the struggles that occurred as different visions for developing the 
Bay came into conflict with each other.  This chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
the early twentieth century commercial improvements.
Chapter three will determine when and why the power shifted away from 
commercial interests.  This chapter seeks to sketch out the social and environmental 
changes that produced both different encounters with the harbor and different ideas about 
the Bay that emerged at the conclusion of the Great Depression.
One caveat before preceding: this is a history of a marine environment that does not deal
significantly with marine biota.  Some may find this approach disregardful of the existing 
historiography regarding marine environments.  But it is not meant to downplay fish 
studies in their multi-faceted and well researched forms.  However, it is meant to 
emphasize that there are other fruitful ways of thinking about marine environments.  I 
argue throughout this work, often implicitly, that the landscape of the Bay has its own 
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history that needs to be appreciated as something more than a simple backdrop for fish 
studies.  From this perspective the history of the Bay has little direct relationship to the 
marketable organisms that have produced many studies and, to some people, even a 
regional identity.17  Its history also has to do with the big boats that shared the waters 
with these organisms.  Even in cans, organisms like salmon were often not as important 
as the timber goods that were hauled in and out of the Bay, and which required alterations 
and careful management of its underwater landscape.
                                                
17. John M. Findlay, “A Fishy Proposition: Regional Identity in the Pacific Northwest,” in Many 
Wests: Place, Culture & Regional Identity, ed. David M. Wrobel and Michael C. Steiner (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1997), 37-70. 
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Chapter One
Experiential Encounters of Bellingham Bay:
Natives, Explorers and Settlers
Humans encountered Bellingham Bay and often formed very different ideas about it.  
This chapter will examine some of the initial experiences that they, particularly non-
Natives, had with the Bay before any development schemes occurred and before the Bay 
took on meaning as a commercial place.  It is possible to see in these early experiences 
the origins of subsequent improvements as well as the challenges that engineers would 
later face as they endeavored to protect their schemes for posterity.  However, in order to 
effectively discuss these encounters it is necessary first to sketch out the historical 
geography (or, geographies) of the Bay as well as the natural processes that shaped it 
before any humans settled in the region.  
Bellingham Bay was not an immutable environment that humans met and 
subsequently altered.  It was in a continual state of change before and after they arrived. 
This is important to recognize since environmental historians have often assumed that 
natural environments were self-regulating and predisposed to climactic and stable states 
that humans, particularly non-Natives, then threw out of balance.  Although these ideas 
are no longer fashionable, and were not so much intended to encompass marine 
environments, a discussion of the ephemeral history of Bellingham Bay prior to human 
contact is also meant to avoid unintentionally reinforcing these dated assumptions in this 
study.18
                                                
18. Rawson, “What Lies Beneath,” 676.  While Clementian ecologic principles were meant to 
describe terrestrial environments, there is some evidence that people once thought about marine 
environments in similar ways.  For instance, Rawson has noted that Bostonians thought that their harbor 
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Bellingham Bay was formed largely from the glacial processes of the last major 
Ice Age.  Glaciers advanced and receded over present-day western Washington State 
several times between roughly 70,000 BCE and 12,000 BCE.  At the end of this period, 
the Vashon, the last large glacier of the period, receded from its farthest southerly point 
near Olympia, Washington, the present-day capital of Washington State.19  As it receded, 
it carved out a deep channel that filled with seawater.  This later became known as Puget 
Sound.  East of Puget Sound, the Vashon Glacier shaped the western slopes of the 
Cascade Mountain Range, but did not grind them down.  Parts of the receding glacier 
broke off and remained in this mountain range east of Bellingham Bay while the larger 
Vashon continued gouging out lowlands to the north, depositing marine glacial sediments 
as it receded into present-day Canada.  The last glacial period left its mark on the region
by scraping out a large bay; leaving a sloping mountain range that begins to rise near the 
eastern shore of the Bay; and creating a flat lowland to the north.20
After the last glacial period, subsequent sea level changes continued to alter the 
size of Bellingham Bay.  At one point, the Bay submerged lands north of its present-day 
western and northern shorelines (possibly beyond the town of Lynden, several miles to 
the north) when glacial isostatic adjustment, also known as post-glacial rebound, pushed 
                                                                                                                                                
was in a state of equilibrium that would exist forever if humans did not disrupt it through landfilling in the 
wrong places.
19. D.J. Kovanen and D.J. Easterbrook, “Late Pleistocene, Post-Vashon, Alpine Glaciation of the 
Nooksack Drainage, North Cascades, Washington,” Geological Society of America Bulletin 113 no. 2 
(February 2001): 276. See for a modeled representation of the furthest extent of glaciation; Curtis Ray 
Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the Rate of 
Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” (master’s thesis, Western Washington University, 1970), 18.  See 
for a description of the various glacial geography in reference to present-day landmarks. 
20. Kovanen and Easterbrook, “Late Pleistocene, Pot-Vashon, Alpine Glaciation of the Nooksack 
Drainage, North Cascades, Washington,” 275-276.
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the shoreline further south.21  Post-glacial rebound is a process whereby the lands 
compressed by the weight of glaciers gradually rise after glacial recession.  As a result of 
this process, the shoreline of Bellingham Bay was pushed south as the area north of the 
present-day western shoreline rose.22
Post-glacial rebound alone did not push the western shoreline of Bellingham Bay 
to its present location; the principal tributary of the Bay, the Nooksack River, was also 
responsible.  After rebounding, the area southwest of Lynden was still mostly a marine 
environment, aside from the present-day Lummi peninsula and the stretch of highlands 
between the City of Ferndale and Birch Bay, which were both islands.  This was the 
geography that the Nooksack River encountered as it descended from the Cascades and 
emptied into Bellingham Bay at a point northeast of the present-day City of Bellingham.  
Somewhere near Lynden the Nooksack River emitted its mountainous sediments into the 
harbor.  The heavier sediments reached the end of their journey at the mouth of the river 
due to the slackened river flow, forming a delta.  One-thousand years after the Vashon 
had receded, this delta expanded west and then south, creating a large alluvial floodplain 
in its wake (partly propped up by further post-glacial rebounding) until it connected with 
the aforementioned island highlands.  The northern and western portions of the present-
day waterfront of Bellingham Bay were made up largely of alluvial deposits that have 
accumulated since the end of the last Glacial Period.  Though isostatic rebound and 
                                                
21. Donald J. Easterbrook, “Late Pleistocene Glacial Events and Relative Sea-Level Changes in 
the North Puget Sound Lowland, Washington,” Geological Society of America Bulletin 74 (1963): 1482; 
Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the Rate of 
Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” 70.
22. Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the 
Rate of Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” 70-72.
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sedimentation slowed by 10,600, naturally occurring sedimentation continues to shape 
the Bay today.23  In fact, the Nooksack River Delta is one of the only Puget Sound 
estuaries still growing, though much of this growth can be attributed to land-use choices 
made in the basin over the last 150 years, and not solely the result of natural processes 
(See chapters two and three).24   
While glacial processes have affected the Bay over a longer period of time, the 
geography of the Bay could also change rather quickly.  For example, before non-Natives 
settled in the region in large numbers—and possibly before they arrived at all—the 
Nooksack River emptied to the west of its present terminus and into Lummi Bay.  To 
understand how this occurred, it is important to understand the character of the Nooksack 
River.  Like most rivers, the entire Nooksack, and not only its delta, was in a constant 
state of flux as it grew into a large floodplain.  For example, the banks of the river shifted 
over time.  A bend in the river could shoal as heavier sediments collected; opposite a 
shoal, the river could erode its bank and send once accumulated sediments and even full 
grown trees downstream.  In this way, the Nooksack River constantly shifted like a 
slithering snake over the floodplain it helped create.  Some of these sediments buttressed 
the bank further downstream.  But much of them were not absorbed at different points 
along the river bank and subsequently found their way into the ever-growing delta.25  As 
                                                
23. Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the 
Rate of Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” 71, 72.
24. RE Sources and the North Sound Baykeeper, “State of the North Sound and Straits,” Re 
Sources (published October 2002), http://www.re-sources.org/pdf/state_of_the_sound.pdf (accessed 
October 23, 2009), 4.
25. House, Nooksack, Skagit And Snohomish Rivers, Washington, 51st Cong., 2d sess., 1890, Ex. 
Doc. No. 38. Captain Thomas Symons and Captain E. H. Jefferson conducted a survey of the Nooksack 
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sediments and felled trees (also known as “snags”) clogged the delta, the likelihood of a 
channel diversion would increase.26  In the nineteenth century, such a log jam was 
responsible for diverting the Nooksack away from Lummi Bay.  At that time, many snags 
collected just east of where the Nooksack emptied into Lummi Bay until the jam finally 
diverted the main channel south into what was then either a small creek or slough and 
into Bellingham Bay.  The exact date of this most recent diversion is not known with 
certainty, but some have surmised that the river changed course in the 1850s or early 
1860s.27  The rerouting of the Nooksack River and its sediments from Lummi Bay to 
                                                                                                                                                
River in 1890.  Their description of the river gives some sense of how the river acted before non-Native
settlement because it was completed just prior to the deforestation along the Nooksack River’s banks.  
Jefferson describes the river as “fringed with heavy timber.”  Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the 
Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the Rate of Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” 
86-90. But, Smelser argues that the Nooksack River was quickly denuded of vegetation after 1891 when
commercial logging began to increase. Thus, this is a fairly good description of how the river may have 
acted before increased non-Native settlement.;  House, Survey of Nooksack River, Washington, 53d Cong., 
3d sess., 1895, Ex. Doc. No. 276, 2.  In 1895, Symons conducted another survey of the Nooksack and 
submitted a report to Congress.  In it he examined how the river changes because of the erosion of one bank 
and the building up of another.
26. Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 156.  Before the Corps of Topographical Engineers 
built a fleet of snag-boats during the mid-nineteenth century, the term “snag” signified all of the matter that 
blocked a river.  The engineers narrowed the meaning, dubbing only material that blocked the main channel 
as a snag.
   
27. The Nooksack River most likely changed course in 1853.  The following evidence generally 
supports this claim; Wayne Suttles, “Post-contact Culture Change Among The Lummi Indians,” British 
Columbia Historical Quarterly 18, nos. 1 & 2 (Jan-Apr 1954): 58, note 32.  Anthropologist Wayne Suttles 
believed that the river changed course sometime after 1853.  His sole piece of evidence was the travel
account of a Theodore Winthrop.  Winthrop, on route from Victoria B.C., traveled up the main stem of the 
Nooksack and purportedly descended a slough into Bellingham Bay in 1853.  Suttles interpreted 
Winthrop’s account to mean that he ascended the main channel of the river at Lummi Bay and descended 
the slough that fed Bellingham Bay where his journey ended;  Senate, Survey of Certain Rivers, 46th Cong., 
3d Sess., 1881, Ex. Doc. No. 39.  Other evidence suggests that Suttles may have been generally correct. 
While surveying the Nooksack in 1881, a Corps engineer noted that the river had formally emptied into 
Lummi Bay twenty years prior.  Habersham was not explicit about his evidence, but most likely it came 
from talking to locals during his survey of the river; House, The Report of the Secretary of War 
Communicating the Several Pacific Railroad Explorations in Three Volumes, 33d Cong., 1st sess., 1855, H. 
Exec. Doc. 129 vol. 1, 492. Yet another account of the river was taken sometime between 1853 and 1855 
by the Northern Railroad Survey.  Their description of Bellingham Bay suggests that the “Lummi River” 
emptied into the Northern end of Bellingham Bay; House, Message from the President of the of the United 
States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the second session of the Thirty-Third 
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Bellingham Bay is an example of a process that likely happened several times over 
thousands of years as the river shifted and eroded its bank and the delta forked around the 
aforementioned islands (which are now known collectively as the Lummi Peninsula).
Even when the terminus of the Nooksack was Bellingham Bay, much of its 
sediments, which were most concentrated during periods of flooding, might never reach 
its waters and, as a result, evade altering the harbor.28  For example, on a few occasions 
in recorded history, the floodwaters of the Nooksack emptied into the Fraser River Basin 
to the north, as well as into the Samish River Basin to the south.29  In a related vein, the 
Nooksack was not entirely responsible for shaping the Bay via its own sediments since 
the Fraser River has also been known to overflow its banks at flood stage and empty its 
sediments into the Nooksack River Basin.  These sediments would, of course, 
subsequently make it into the Bay, thus altering the geography.30
Humans would come to Bellingham Bay and find reason to change it, but they did 
not encounter a stable or self-regulating nature.  It was an environment in continual flux.  
It could change slowly over lengthy periods of time and then, at other times, rather 
suddenly.  Glaciers, sediments and snags all shaped Bellingham Bay before any humans 
                                                                                                                                                
Congress, 33d Cong., 2d Sess., 1854, Ex. Doc. No. 1, 455.  The Secretary of the Interior reported roughly 
the same information as the Railroad Survey in the 1854 Presidential report; House, Survey of Nooksack 
River, Washington, 53d Cong., 3d sess., 1895, Ex. Doc. No. 276, 5.  However, oral accounts provided by 
“old Indians” were cited in another report by Captain Thomas Symons of the Corps regarding the changing 
course of the river.  These Natives informed Symons that the river had not emptied into Lummi Bay for 
“nearly a century.”  This last source is suspect due to the lengthy period from the time the when river 
supposedly changed course and when the oral accounts were recorded.  It also contradicts other evidence.  
But, it also suggests the possibility of another diversion within historic times.
28.  Smelser, “Sequent Occupance of the Nooksack River Valley and the Influence of Man on the 
Rate of Sediment Delivery to Bellingham Bay,” 82.  
29.  House, Nooksack River, Washington, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, Doc. No. 159, 11. 
30. Senate, Survey of Certain Rivers, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1881, Ex. Doc. No. 39, 7.
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settled in the region.  Many of these processes would continue to change the Bay on into 
the period of human occupancy, affecting the history of the region—a topic which will be 
discussed more fully in chapters two and three.  
Native Americans were the first humans to encounter Bellingham Bay.  The term “Straits 
Salish” is generally ascribed to the various kin groups that occupied much of what is now 
the northern extent of Puget Sound and the southern portion of the Straits of Georgia.  
According to ethnologists, all of the Straits Salish kin groups shared roughly the same 
language (Coast Salish) and culture.  While several kin groups may have resided at the 
Bay sporadically to fish, such as the Klallams, the Lummi resided at Bellingham Bay 
nearly year-round, and they were the largest group to occupy the Bay when non-Natives 
settled.31  
Surprisingly—as Boxberger once noted—few written records mention anything 
about the Lummi prior to non-Native settlement in the mid-nineteenth century.  Early 
explorers stumbled upon settlements that were probably used by the Lummi, but these 
sites were uninhabited.  Boxberger surmised that because the Lummi did not participate 
in the fur trade to the extent that other kin groups had, record of them is sparse.32  
In spite of this dearth of written sources, it is safe to say that the Lummi 
experienced the Bay mostly through fishing before non-Natives arrived.  Salmon were 
central to their culture and often determined how they organized their production—
                                                
31. Boxberger, To Fish in Common, 11, 12, 17.
32.Boxberger, To Fish in Common, chap. 1.  The information on the prehistory of the Lummi was 
taken from a synthetic chapter by Boxberger.
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particularly as they assembled and manned weir technology.  The importance of salmon 
to their production is particularly interesting because among the Pacific Northwest Coast 
tribes the Lummi and other nearby Salish speaking tribes cannot be overestimated.  So 
dependent were they on marine organisms that they developed and utilized all known 
salmon fishing technologies.33  Although their impact on salmon and other marine 
species is difficult to say for certain, some historians and anthropologists have estimated 
that Native catches could be extremely large.34  
But aside from their role in shaping salmon fisheries, the Lummi have not been 
associated with the physical changes that occurred to the landscape of the Bay during the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  Corps records, which are the most detailed sources 
regarding these changes to the underwater landscape of Bellingham Bay, never mention 
the role of the Lummi ever affecting such things as the rate of sedimentation and 
navigability (either by facilitation or obstruction).  There is some evidence, however, that 
suggests that the Corps did not know of, or fully appreciate, the de-snagging efforts of the 
Lummi at the turn-of-the-century.  For instance, D. C. Govan, a Washington State Indian 
Agent, reported in 1896 that an obstruction at the mouth of the Nooksack (which had 
been caused by a boom constructed by a local mill company) was partly cleared by the 
Lummi.  It is not likely that the Lummi intended to promote navigation by their actions 
because the drift threatened to backup the river and wash away an entire Lummi village.  
“Such a catastrophe,” writes Govan, “was only prevented…by the watchfulness of the 
Indians, assisted by Mr. Evans, the [reservation teacher].”  Govan goes on to explain that
                                                
33. Boxberger, To Fish in Common, 191-194. 
34. Taylor, Making Salmon, 13-38.  Taylor provides a detailed summary of anthropological and 
historical research on pre-contact Native American salmon fisheries.
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the Lummi “were compelled to work for several days to protect themselves from 
threatened destruction by the floods.”35  Since the Lummi Reservation resided in a 
precarious location next to the mouth of the river, and because the Nooksack Delta was 
constantly obstructed, it is likely that the Lummi often found it necessary to clear parts of 
the Nooksack Delta like they did in 1896. 
While the Lummi may not have received adequate credit for their de-snagging 
efforts, their lack of participation in the northeasterly harbor improvements, which will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters, is also evident in the Corps records.  It is safer to 
say, however, that they did not play a role in deciding the fate of this portion of the Bay.  
Their exclusion from these improvements is likely the result of their marginal political 
and economic status in the region, which Boxberger has demonstrated was the result of 
racial discrimination.  Moreover, racial discrimination may also have been a reason why 
the Lummi were excluded from expressing their ideas about nature onto other parts of the 
Bay while the underwater landscape was changed by others, such as the Corps.36     
Of all the Natives, Europeans and Asians that charted and/or settled at Bellingham Bay, it 
was the English name for the Bay that has held.  Captain George Vancouver “discovered” 
                                                
35. House, Report of the Secretary of the Interior; Being Part of the Message and Documents 
Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-Fourth 
Congress. In Five Volumes. Volume II, 54 Cong., 1st sess., 1896, Document 5, 318, 319.
36. Boxberger, To Fish in Common.  See for a general history of the Lummi.  Boxberger details 
how the Lummi were economically marginalized by non-Natives during the early twentieth century.    
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Bellingham Bay in 1792 and named it purportedly after Sir William Bellingham of the 
British Navy.37  
It is unclear what meaning was intended, or if any meaning was intended at all, by 
its designation as a “bay.”  For instance, did the explorers consider it a distinctive body of 
water that stood apart from the Puget Sound and the Pacific Ocean?  Was its designation 
supposed to imply safety and security, perhaps?  The word “bay,” like most words, has a 
long and shifting history, and a probing of it does not shed much light on these questions.  
Though primarily associated with marine waters nowadays, the word has terrestrial as 
well as marine origins.  Around the fifteenth century, the word “bay,” in a descriptive 
geographical sense, was used to signify any of the following: an “indentation or rounded 
projection of the land into the sea”; “an indentation, recess in a range of hills”; or “an arm 
of a prairie extending into, and partly surrounded by, woods.”  When it became 
associated with marine waters in more recent times, the word did not necessarily imply 
that an indentation of water held different characteristics than the waters that it diverged 
from.  In the nineteenth century, for instance, a body of water could be labeled as a bay 
regardless of whether or not it proved safe for anchoring vessels.  The Bay of Biscay, for 
instance, was “noted for its heavy seas and dangerous navigation.”  Yet, smaller vessels, 
presumably ill-equipped for dangerous waters, were named “Bay Vessels.”  Furthermore, 
bays could be deep like the “Bay of Portugall” [sic], which “hath an vnknowne bottome,” 
or shallow since “bay whaling” generally occurred in shallower waters where cows 
                                                
37.  Lelah Jackson Edson, The Fourth Corner: Highlights from the Early Northwest (Bellingham: 
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calved.38  Although it is evident that some sort of meaning was being applied to 
Bellingham Bay by its cartographic separation from the Puget Sound, it is unclear, 
however, what type of meaning was intended through its designation as a bay, or whether 
it was a description derived from nothing more than a casual encounter. 
Anglo-American explorers and settlers were more explicit about their encounters 
with Bellingham Bay and the meaning that they derived from these encounters.  Soon 
after they began to settle in the region—and the Lummi and other nearby Native groups 
were removed to the reservation at the mouth of the Nooksack—the Bay took on national 
significance as a place that might connect the two coasts of the nation.  Some of the 
earliest records of Bellingham Bay come from the Pacific Railroad Survey.  This survey, 
also known by its longer title Reports of Explorations and Surveys, to ascertain the most 
practicable and economical route for a railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific 
Ocean, was published in 13 volumes between the years 1855 and 1860.  This work was 
composed of the results of five different railroad surveys of the continental United States: 
two across the southwest, one across the central latitude, another along the northern 
border and one last north-south survey along the Pacific Coast.39  
                                                
38. “bay, n.2” Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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The railroad surveys across the American West were multi-faceted.  Surveyors 
reported on various things while determining the most “economical route” between the 
two coasts.  For instance, they reported extensively on the geology, zoology and botany 
of the lands they encountered.  A deep knowledge of the natural world was not peripheral 
to their goals of placing railroads; it was thought to be essential for choosing the most 
auspicious transcontinental path.  At Bellingham Bay, for example, attention was given to 
cataloging different animal species such as salmon and “ouzels”—a duck-like creature 
that the surveyors found especially curious.40  The railroad surveys demonstrate that 
Americans settlers and explorers were not running roughshod over natural environments 
as they moved west, for they thought carefully about the lands that they encountered and 
chronicled their experiences with natural environments in great detail.    
Due to its coastal location, Bellingham Bay was considered as a possible location 
for a railroad terminus by the leaders of the northern survey: Governor Isaac Stevens and 
Captain George McClellan.  The waters surrounding Steilacoom, Seattle and Port 
Discovery also caught their attention.  All four had their advantages and faults, but 
Bellingham Bay was advantageous because coal had been discovered close to its shore 
(actually, a coal seam, which is now closed, reaches underneath the Bay) and which the 
surveyors surmised was of good quality.41  The coal seams at Bellingham Bay were the 
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1859, Ex. Doc. 46, 176, 268, 311. 
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first on the west coast to be mined and, according to one geologist, remained so for 
several years.42
The discovery of coal at Bellingham Bay was a potential boon for regional 
development.  The surveyors recognized its potential for economically linking the nation 
since the railroads required coal for power.  But the discovery was also important because 
it offered steam powered ships the resource necessary to make the gigantic leap across 
the Pacific, allowing for the expansion of trade with Asia, which traditional forms of 
ocean travel could not accomplish with the speed and reliability that steam travel offered.  
The surveyors considered trans-Pacific transportation so important that they devoted an 
entire chapter to the topic.  It is also why Bellingham Bay was seriously considered as a 
potential terminus. The Bay was a bay, and a ready supply of energy on its nearby shores 
made it an attractive nerve center for expanding American trade and economic 
networks.43
While the Bay offered itself as a potential terminus because of its coal, it could 
not accommodate all of the needs that the end of a railroad required.  Its largest fault was 
its depth.  Because of its shallowness, the Bay made access to the shoreline to obtain the 
much needed coal difficult.  Surveyors complained that “the coal at Bellingham Bay must 
be lightered on board vessels” since “the water being shallow to a considerable distance 
from the shore.”44  The shallowness of the Bay was also cause for concern because the 
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surveyors were aware that the size and draft of oceangoing vessels was increasing 
substantially.  Furthermore, if Bellingham Bay were to become a terminus, the problems 
that the surveyors faced while transporting coal across it would surely beset the larger 
vessels that they expected would utilize the harbor.  Since future shipping needs were 
difficult to project, McClellan voiced his concern about placing a railroad terminus at any 
site except Seattle—Elliot Bay was the only body of water that he was completely 
confident would continue to berth large vessels because of its estimated 50 foot depth.  
Furthermore, McClellan commented that “the deep water [of Elliot Bay] comes so near 
the shore that but very short wharves will be required.”45  While some, like Lieut. 
Trowbridge, envisioned that wharves could be easily constructed to cover the shallow 
tidelands of Bellingham Bay, the reports lacked unanimous agreement about the 
prospects of placing a terminus at Bellingham Bay because, simply, the Bay was too 
shallow to accommodate the uses the surveyors envisioned for it.46
Despite its shallowness, the Bay favored other aspects of navigation for 
nineteenth century observers.  Because of its relative isolation from the rougher waters of 
the Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Bay did the service of protecting 
vessels during stormy weather.  Edward Eldridge, a prominent local resident with a self-
professed expertise of all things maritime, pointed out this natural advantage of the Bay 
in a letter that he wrote to Congress.  Because of this advantage, he urged the federal 
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government to improve the Bay and improve the qualities of it that had frustrated the 
railroad surveyors.47
Although the Bay had some natural advantages that aided the type of labor that 
federal agents found important, it never became a transcontinental railroad terminus, even 
though some in the adjacent communities vigorously pursued a terminus after the Civil 
War.  Local leaders entertained the last great railroad magnate J. J. Hill several times up 
through the turn-of-the-century.  As a result of his visits, land speculation ran high, 
especially owing to Hill’s waterfront landholdings north and south of Bellingham’s port 
facilities.48  In the end, their wishes were left unfulfilled; Hill chose to end his railroad 
further south of Bellingham Bay.49
The reason why Hill repeatedly decided against ending a rail line at Bellingham 
Bay is uncertain.  It may have owed to the fact that no survey over the Northern Cascades 
had been completed.  But the Bay’s limitations were likely important reasons as well.  
Klingle describes Hill as a “capitalist who thought like an engineer” because he paid 
careful attention to the strengths and limitations of the lands that he purchased.  Hill 
wanted his railroad to end at a deep seaport and he carefully sought out a harbor that fit 
his vision.  Since he had been known to personally inspect his Bellingham Bay 
properties, he may have determined then that Bellingham Bay did not fit his idea of a 
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deep draft port and decided against ending a railroad at a natural terminus that did not 
favor the human activities he wished to nurture. 50
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Chapter Two
Putting Bellingham Bay to Work
When the Great Northern Railway Company announced that the terminus of what would 
be the last transcontinental railroad would reach Puget Sound south of Bellingham Bay, 
the news disappointed both the local community and its distant investors.  But their 
frustration did not sully their dreams of one day making Bellingham Bay a railroad 
metropolis.  This is because they held onto the belief that another transcontinental 
railroad would be proposed in the future.  While these hopes occasionally languished, 
they could be quickly stoked again, for instance, from a visit by J. J. Hill on his way to 
inspect his Bellingham Bay properties.51  
But in order for the community to accomplish their goals, they had to be ready.  In 
preparation, some endeavored to complete the railroad survey over the northern Cascades 
that needed to be finished before a railroad could be planned and constructed.52  When it 
came to the Bay, many in the community welcomed federal efforts to improve its noted 
limitations (See chapter 1) so that it would appear more attractive to railroad makers.
Even as the Great Northern decided that Bellingham Bay was inadequate, 
Congress and the Corps were determined to put the Bay to work, to borrow terminology 
from historian Richard White.  In other words, they sought to re-make the energy of the 
Bay so that it favored human labor—in this case, navigation.  This involved dredging the 
Bay floor; contemplating and making tributary adjustments; and regulating how visitors 
and residents used the Bay.
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Originally, the federal government took the lead on this front.  Although many in 
the community would later become ardent boosters of Bay improvements, their vision of 
an improved Bay would diverge from and, at times, conflict with the goals of the federal 
government in the years immediately following the Great Northern decision.  Briefly, 
these differences surfaced because what the community saw in government plans was a 
means of making land out of the Bay, while the government viewed its efforts as purely 
for the benefit of navigation.
The reason that federal agents became interested in improving Bellingham Bay, as 
well as many other national waterways, developed from their souring relationship with 
the railroad industry.  In 1873, for example, President Grant expressed frustration with 
the railroads during an annual address to Congress when he cited the “lack of cheap 
transportation” as a reason for that year’s economic panic.  Until the 1887 Interstate 
Commerce Act was passed, which created a commission to regulate railroads, little could 
be done to bring down rail costs.  Without this ability to directly regulate the railroads, 
Congress could not act on the President’s warnings.  Instead, Congress viewed the 
prospects of improving the nation’s waterways as a means of indirectly wresting the 
control that railroads had over transportation rates.  According to water policy specialists 
Robert and William Hull, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1876 (which 
President Grant signed into law) was the first of many appropriations that sought to create 
a source of “natural” competition for the railroads by intensively developing national 
waterways—a goal that, as we shall see, lived on long after the railroad commission had 
been established.  In the matter of a few decades, the social meaning that the federal 
government had given Bellingham Bay had essentially flipped as Congress, which had 
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once seen the Bay as a feature of nature that could house a railroad terminus, now viewed 
the Bay as a regulator of railroads.53  
Congress put the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—which had been reformulated 
during the Civil War—in charge of this national waterways project.54  In addition to 
maintaining and creating navigable waterways, this agency was responsible for 
determining proper regulatory measures and deciding which rivers and harbors would 
serve the larger goals of the Corps most adequately.55  The Corps came to Bellingham 
Bay with these purposes in mind.  The recommendations of the Corps led to the turn-of-
the-century improvements of the Bay that will be discussed momentarily.
Plans for making a navigable harbor out of Bellingham Bay began rather 
modestly.  Congress assigned the Corps its first task in 1880.  In this year legislators 
passed a rivers and harbors act that provided for a survey of three Puget Sound rivers: the 
Stillaguamish, Snohomish and Nooksack.  Congress desired to know if these rivers could 
be improved for the commercial betterment of local populations.  Col. G. L. Gillespie, 
along with his assistant engineer Robert A. Habersham, conducted the survey and 
reported back to Congress via their superior, the Secretary of War.56  
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After surveying Bellingham Bay and the Nooksack River, Gillespie and 
Habersham concluded that if these waterways were improved they could handle 
increased steamer commerce.  The respective river deltas, however, were major 
impediments to increased commerce.  Like all Puget Sound tributaries, these rivers 
suffered from shoaling at their mouths, making navigation to the upriver farming 
communities tenuous.  Regarding the Nooksack River specifically, it was driftwood that 
was the greatest obstacle blocking steamers from reaching the upstream communities.  At 
the time of his survey, shallow draft steamers could approach and enter the river at all 
tides because the mouth of the river consisted of mudflats that were completely covered 
by water to a depth of 1 to 3 feet at low tide.  While this depth was too shallow for 
steamboats to traverse at all tides, three distinct channels had scoured through the tide 
flats and offered steamers a depth of four feet at low tide—an appropriate depth for 
steamer traffic.  Unfortunately, two of these channels had been blocked by driftwood, 
which left the navigability of the river in an unreliable state if more debris were to choke 
off the remaining channel.  
Gillespie and Habersham believed that clearing the debris from the mouth of the 
river would be followed by increased settlement and further development of the basin’s 
commercial agriculture.  Also, because the Nooksack Basin was without rail services or 
good roads, the engineers surmised that the farmers of the fertile region would never 
market their produce until the basin’s most practical entry point at the delta was opened 
up permanently to shipping.
The engineers suggested a relatively cheap solution to this problem, which was 
for the government to fund the construction and operation of a snag-boat that would 
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regularly clear the river and its delta.  This recommendation was made more economical 
because the engineers envisioned that the snag-boat would also work other Puget Sound 
rivers for the same purpose.57  Throughout the 1880s, several congressional 
appropriations were made for the upkeep of these river deltas, marking the first federally 
funded improvement of the Puget Sound.  All told, Congress spent 67,000 dollars on 
improving and maintaining these rivers during this period.58  
In spite of these efforts, the desired outcomes were not quite what the Corps had 
originally anticipated in 1880.  “The operation of the snag boat has done a great deal of 
good on these rivers,” wrote a Corps engineer at the beginning of the 1890s, “but the 
amount of money available has never been sufficient to enable the boat to do the 
necessary and desirable work.”59  With regard to the Nooksack, the Corps was unable to 
remove snags and, as a result, the mouth of the Nooksack continued to inhibit commerce 
into the basin.  
But a decade of relatively ineffective de-snagging did not discourage interest in 
overcoming this navigational stumbling block.  Washington State officials, for instance, 
showed interest in improving commerce across the Delta.  Shortly after admittance into 
the Union, representatives from this state wasted no time in preparing a memorial for 
Congress beseeching the latter to remove all obstructions to navigation along the 
Nooksack.  Allen Weir, the Secretary of Washington State, drafted the proposal, which 
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was then endorsed by both houses of the state legislature in early December of 1889.  The 
memorial touted that the Nooksack Basin had the “most extensive agricultural valley in 
Western Washington.”  But because the river was still too dangerous for steamer traffic, 
the produce of the valley could not reach market.  While railroads had extended into 
several parts of the basin in the ten years following the 1880 survey, state legislators did 
not view the presence of rail as beneficial to the growth of commercial agriculture.  They 
claimed that farmers were forced to pay from 16 to 20 dollars per ton to ship produce to 
Bellingham Bay.  The memorial declared that “the produce of the farmer [was] rendered 
valueless, transportation taking its price, rendering that industry to little or no profit.”  In 
their view, an improved Nooksack River would be the best way to develop and transport 
the agricultural resources of the valley to Bellingham Bay and beyond, thus bypassing 
exorbitant freight rates.60  
The pleas coming from the Washington State Legislature seem to have been heard 
because Congress authorized more surveys of the Nooksack in order to determine the 
costs and benefits of improving it further.  As a result of these surveys, which were 
performed during the 1890s, more ambitious plans were devised for improving the river 
and the Bay into a modern conduit for navigation.
While assessing these waterways, the Corps discovered new problems.  During 
the 1891 survey, engineers found that the mouth of the river was no longer passable at all 
tides because the navigable channels that had once cut through the tide flats no longer 
existed.  Three causes explain this development: the aforementioned change of the river’s 
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course (see chapter one), increased non-Native settlement of the Nooksack Basin, and the 
blockage of the mouth by log booms.  
Natural sedimentation was largely responsible for the creation of the western 
shoreline before humans came to the region.  Therefore, when the river altered its course 
into Bellingham Bay, the newest obstruction to navigation was likely the result of the  
sedimentation that had naturally flowed into the Bay over the course of roughly thirty-
five years.  
But the new obstruction also resulted from increased upriver settlement where 
farmers were clearing away forest for agriculture (later, the logging industry would finish 
the job of denuding the basin that farmers had started).  Because the forests of the basin 
held sediments in place, their removal allowed the annual floods to easily wash away 
large amounts of material from the floodplain and into the Bay.61  Thus, the obstruction at 
the delta was likely a product of human induced sedimentation along with naturally 
occurring sedimentation.    
Lastly, newly constructed log booms were also clogging the river.  Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, logging companies, such as the Bellingham Bay Boom 
Co., had placed these booms at the mouth of the river in order to catch logs sent down 
river.  These logs were then received by the burgeoning lumber industry, which had 
sprouted along the eastern shoreline of Bellingham Bay, for processing and/or shipping.  
One particular boom was troublesome for navigation because it largely restricted steamer 
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access to the river except through an ill kept “trip,” which in theory could be opened for 
ships to pass through.  But this trip, like the entire boom, was constantly collecting 
detritus and further jamming the river, making navigation through the structure 
impossible.  
It is difficult to say for certain what caused the newest obstructions; however, the 
combination of all three developments was likely to blame.  
Remarkably, Congress and the Corps did not give up on the improvement.  In 
fact, they responded to these new threats quite ardently.  Their actions demonstrate just 
how intent they were on making the Bay a place for commerce.  Furthermore, they would 
no longer allow changes to occur to the Bay (intentional or otherwise) that complicated 
their efforts to make the Bay serve this purpose. 
When Captain Thomas Symons of the Corps learned of the driftwood jam and 
began to investigate, he became concerned that the increasing sediment load of the river 
might have a more drastic impact on the navigability of the whole Bay and not only in the 
vicinity of the Nooksack Delta.  His concern was that the sedimentation would fill the 
entire harbor (an assessment, however, that he would later discredit).  In 1892, Symons 
submitted a report to Congress recommending that the government pay the cost of 
protecting the Bay from filling.  His evidence for this alarming rate of sedimentation 
came from visiting with longtime residents of Bellingham Bay.  Edward Eldridge, one of 
these residents, offered a lengthy letter to Symons, which was subsequently published 
along with the engineer’s report to Congress.  In this letter, Eldridge explained that both 
natural and human induced sedimentation had not only caused obstructions at the delta, 
pushing the tide flats out a mile and a quarter over the preceding forty years, but had 
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drifted over to the commercially viable part of the northwesterly harbor as well, further 
impeding navigation there.  Eldridge estimated that the already shallow harbor was filling 
at the astonishing rate of one foot per year.62        
Symons proposed drastic measures be taken to deal with these perceived threats to 
navigation.  He, along with Eldridge, recommended that the Corps force the Nooksack 
River into Lummi Bay in order to limit sedimentation coming into Bellingham harbor.  
Additionally, Symons proposed another solution: if diverting the river proved too 
difficult, the Corps should at least dike the mouth of the river so that its silty waters 
would be forced away from the harbor’s northeasterly port facilities.  But before any 
action was taken, Symons recommended that another, more extensive survey be 
conducted to critically assess both the problem and the potential solutions.63
A reason that Symons recommended a further assessment was because some in 
the “community” (Symons did not identify exactly to whom in the community he was 
referring) were averse to a planned diversion.  He reported that while some believed that 
a diversion would likely protect the Bay from filling with sediments, it would also disrupt 
the biological makeup of the Bay, which also protected navigation.  Their concern was 
with a non-native marine snail, which they referred to as simply “teredo.”64  This snail 
had caused much damage to both boats and wharfs.  Most likely, the snail found its way 
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into Bellingham Bay in the same fashion that it had entered other parts of the Puget 
Sound: within the hull of a wooden ship (it was also known by the colloquialism 
“shipworm” for this reason).  During the late nineteenth century, it was commonly 
thought that shipworm were harmed by changes in salinity—for instance from the influx 
of fresh water (this belief was only recently confirmed by scientists).65  Symons’ report 
indicates that some residents of the Bay thought this to be true.  As a result, Symons 
reported to Congress that the benefits of any proposed diversion of the Nooksack be 
carefully weighed against the possible increase of teredo “as there are persons,” he 
writes, “who think [that the impact of the Nooksack River on teredo] an advantage 
paramount to the disadvantage of the sediment brought down by the river.”66       
Later in the decade, while conducting the follow-up survey that he himself had 
recommended, Symons found that some of his earlier assessments were both false and 
true.  For instance, the Nooksack Delta was indeed growing.  But their was no evidence 
that sedimentation had built up the mudflat in front of the northeasterly parts of the 
harbor, as Symons had been led to believe by Eldridge.  Symons compared two surveys 
of Bellingham Bay to determine this.  The Coast Survey data that was gathered in 1855, 
compared with the recently completed Coast and Geodetic Survey of 1891, revealed to 
him that the depth of the Bay in front of Bellingham harbor was nearly identical in both 
years.  In his view, navigation in the harbor was not threatened by increased 
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sedimentation and thus drastic measures, such as diverting the Nooksack, were not 
necessary.67  
Furthermore, Symons learned that the teredo infestation was even worse than he 
was earlier led to believe.  It had inflicted much damage to the important wharves that 
lined the Bay from the City of New Whatcom to the City of Fairhaven.  “So important is 
this fresh water considered,” Symons had learned, “that a strong protest would go up 
against the project of deflecting [the river] from the harbor.”  The teredo infestation and 
its negative impact on commerce, via wharf and ship damage, was an important reason 
why Symons decided against a drastic improvement of the river.68  
David B. Ogden, an assistant engineer for the Corps, added that a diversion of the 
river would likely hinder, rather than improve, navigation.  He reported that the rough 
water approach to Lummi Bay was too dangerous for smaller vessels, which were the 
principal users of the river.  Bellingham Bay provided a much safer entrance to the river 
and was another reason why a potential diversion was tabled.69  
While the Corps still planned to improve the choked Nooksack Delta, it would 
have to be in a lesser way.  Unfortunately, the legality of such an improvement became a 
problem that eventually brought the federal government into conflict with the Bellingham 
Bay Boom Co.  The details of this legal dispute are discussed below.     
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As the nineteenth century neared a close, many saw the opportunity for expanding 
commerce in the northern Puget Sound.  Moreover, they had a vision for creating a 
commercial network that was not reliant on rail transportation.  Engineers and legislators 
both saw the potential to realize these goals through a reengineering of Bellingham Bay.  
While the limitations of the Bay did not discourage them (as it had for the railroad 
surveyors of a previous generation; see chapter one) their efforts to improve the Bay 
proved easier to plan than execute.  The failed de-snagging operations are an example of 
this.  Moreover, the increasing rate of sedimentation along with the introduction of teredo 
created new problems for engineers as they were forced to choose between silt and a 
wharf-hungry marine snail.  Though they viewed teredo as the greater of the two evils, 
the engineers were still mired by the clogging delta.
One would expect that this worsening scenario would bring an end to further Bay 
improvements.  Yet, the Corps would continue to push for grander alterations of the Bay 
in the coming years, namely through dredging.  Moreover, they would even push for 
these improvements after new navigational problems would emerge—specifically 
regarding dumping (see below).  Their continued interest in improving the Bay 
underscores how important it was to them as a regulator of transportation rates and a 
symbol of economic development.
By 1895, the Nooksack River improvement was no longer going to be a dramatic scheme 
for the reasons discussed, but the Corps was still unable to proceed with the removal of 
the obstruction at the mouth of the river due to a legal dispute between the justice 
department and the Bellingham Bay Boom Co.  The latter, it seems, had constructed a 
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boom for catching logs floated downstream by loggers.  These logs were then transported 
to the nearby mills at New Whatcom and Fairhaven or rafted elsewhere along the coast 
for processing.  But because of the boom’s faulty trip (a gate that opens and closes for 
river traffic) detritus had collected in the boom to the extent that the structure was 
obstructing navigation.  Since the trip failed to open and allow vessels through the boom, 
the federal government sued the company for obstructing navigation.  United States v. 
Bellingham Bay Boom Co. was originally decided in favor of the boom company; 
however, the ruling, which is discussed in more detail below, was appealed all the way to 
the U.S. Supreme Court where this court overturned the previous rulings.
The suit is important because it demonstrates that not everyone viewed the 
purpose of marine environments in the same way.  Some in the community, like the 
owners of the boom, had different ideas about what types of human activities the Bay 
should facilitate.  In the past, Congress and the Corps had to contend with the 
navigational problems caused both by sedimentation (both natural and unnatural) and the 
introduction of teredo.  But luckily for them, the Bay (like “Nature” more generally) is 
not an active agent that has its own predisposed meaning or inherent purpose; therefore, 
the Bay cannot actively revolt against human attempts to alter its features.  The issue over 
the boom, however, represents the first of many conflicts amongst Bay residents over 
what types of activities the Bay should complement; in other words, it draws attention to 
the fact that some Bay residents had different ideas about the social meaning of their 
adjacent harbor.  The suit also points to a larger trend on the part of the federal 
government to secure more power over national waterways in order to legalize its 
conception of the meaning of these environments for others to follow. 
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In order to understand the importance of the dispute over the log boom, it is 
important to understand its relationship with the evolving legal and legislative discourses
regarding national marine water law.  A particularly important dispute that will shed light 
on the state of marine law is Willamette Iron Bridge Company v. Hatch.  This case, which 
the U.S. Supreme Court cited in the decision to United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom
Co., was decided in 1888.  The case involved the Willamette Iron Bridge Co. and its plan 
to build a bridge across the Willamette River at a point within the city limits of Portland, 
Oregon.  When the State of Oregon passed legislation assenting to the construction of the 
bridge, two Portland businessmen, who were unhappy with the proposed bridge, moved 
to stop its construction.  The businessmen filed suit and asserted that the bridge company 
would violate federal law by constructing the bridge.  They maintained that the bridge 
company required, but did not possess, the permission of the Secretary of War to 
proceed.70       
The plaintiffs offered two arguments why the planned crossing should be 
construed as a violation of federal law.  First, they argued that because the river carried 
commerce, it would be a violation of U.S. law to obstruct the river. This argument 
invoked the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, which allows U.S. citizens the 
right to move freely about navigable rivers.  But upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found this argument specious; they ruled that the commerce clause applied only to 
interstate waterways.  Since the Willamette River was wholly within the state of Oregon, 
this law did not give the federal government any jurisdiction over the river (the Supreme 
Court did not agree with the plaintiff’s creative claim that tidal effects from the Pacific 
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Ocean made the Willamette River, up to Portland, part of a larger interstate water 
system).  Therefore, the bridge company did not require federal approval for the project, 
only state approval.71  
The other argument that the plaintiffs offered was that because the government 
had already allocated funds for improving the Willamette, federal jurisdiction over the 
entire river was implied.  The court, however, denied this claim as well because the 
Willamette River appropriations did not explicitly assert federal power over the entire 
river.72  
While the final ruling resolved the bridge dispute, the decision had far reaching 
implications.  Mainly, the case demonstrated that the federal government lacked authority 
over many other intrastate waterways.  This discovery was ironic given that Congress 
was beginning to develop national waterways more intensively.  The Justice who wrote 
the decision was unequivocal about the fact that Congress had not yet passed legislation 
that permitted federal officials the right to police intrastate waterways and that legislators 
simply needed to do so.  An excerpt of the decision reads as follows: “Until Congress 
acts respecting navigable streams entirely within a state, the state has plenary power….”73
It was not long after the 1888 ruling that Congress enacted this needed legislation.  
In fact, several legislators had tried to pass such a law in previous years; however, these 
bills died without a vote.  Finally, in 1890, an amendment to the Rivers and Harbors Act 
of 1890 extended more federal power over navigable waterways.  Legislators found it 
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easier to slip the law into a rivers and harbors appropriation because these appropriations 
were typically utilized by Congressmen as logrolling bills during the late nineteenth 
century.74  The anti-obstruction law that legislators finally agreed to was incorporated 
under Section 10 of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Act (hereafter, “Sec. 10”).  It stated 
“[t]hat the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the 
navigable capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United States has jurisdiction, is 
hereby prohibited.” (Note the clause “not affirmatively authorized by law” for the 
moment)  Holding what it thought to be an unambiguous mandate to manage all 
navigable waterways, the justice department proceeded to undermine the legal 
obstruction that prohibited the Corps from clearing the physical obstruction at the mouth 
of the Nooksack River.  
Unfortunately, the legal battle that ensued revealed that the new anti-obstruction 
law contained problems that made it ineffective.  When United States v. Bellingham Bay 
Boom Co. began in May of 1891, the U.S. Attorney General claimed that the boom 
company had violated the newly enacted Sec. 10. and that the federal government had the 
right to remove it.  However, both the Circuit Court for the District of Washington, 
Northern Division and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed.  They 
perceived some wiggle room for interpreting Sec. 10—in their view, the new law was not 
meant to undermine preexisting state law as the U.S. Attorney General had argued it was 
intended to do.  Thus these two courts did not interpret the phrase “not affirmatively 
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authorized by law” to mean solely federal law.  With regard to United States v. 
Bellingham Bay Boom Co., the courts ruled that the boom company had obtained 
authorization from the state government before the passage of Sec. 10, therefore the 
obstruction was still legal.75
Finally, after a ten year legal bout, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court where the previous rulings were overturned.  Interestingly, the Justices agreed with 
the lower courts—because the boom had been erected before Sec. 10 had been passed, it 
was legal.  However, they discovered that the boom company had not entirely complied 
with Washington State law because the boom did not provide room for vessels to pass 
along the shoreline, which the law clearly stipulated.  Therefore, the entire obstruction 
was not legitimate under preexisting state law.  As a result, the previous rulings were 
overruled and the log boom could no longer block the Nooksack River since the state 
could not authorize a new boom as the result of Sec. 10.  The delta could now be 
improved.76  A rivers and harbors act provided the funds for the removal of the jam after 
the turn-of-the-century (the outcome of this improvement will be discussed in the 
following chapter).  
While the federal government emerged the victor, federal officials found that they 
still lacked the power to police Bellingham Bay completely, as well as waterways like it.  
While Sec. 10 granted the federal government more power to regulate intrastate 
commerce, the ambiguous wording of the law made it ineffective in some instances.  
Besides the ambiguity that surfaced in United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., Sec. 
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10, it was overly explicit about what could not be thrown into waterways.  Dumpers, in 
effect, retained the right to obstruct navigable waters with things that the law did not 
explicitly ban.  Also, the burden of proof was on the justice department to prove that the 
material emitted into a given waterway was done so with explicit malice towards 
navigation.  According to historian Albert Cowdrey—who has researched the origins of 
these anti-obstruction laws—jurists of the period often refused to convict dumpers unless 
malice was evident, making enforcement of Sec. 10 nearly impossible since most 
dumpers were interested in disposing of waste and not dumping to intentionally obstruct 
navigation.77  
During the 1890s, anti-obstruction proponents enacted new legislation to solve 
these problems.  Sec. 13 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbor Appropriation, which is also 
commonly referred to as the “Refuse Act,” clarified many of the problems with Sec. 10.78  
The Refuse Act explicitly stated that only obstructions authorized by the federal 
government were legal.  The law also went further by redefining what a legally 
permissible obstruction was.  Paradoxically, the Refuse Act was even more ambiguous on 
what could be dumped into navigable waters, making it more effective.  The law did not 
explicitly state what materials were illegal to throw into navigable waterways and added 
the provision that the Secretary of War was ultimately responsible for granting 
permission to would-be dumpers on a case-by-case basis (several decades later, this 
provision was famously reinterpreted by the Supreme Court during the water quality 
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debates of the 1960s and 1970s to mean that the Corps had the right to set up a permit 
program in order to regulate industrial pollution).79   
The boom incident was important for several reasons.  First, it demonstrated that 
it was not a forgone conclusion that marine waterways like Bellingham Bay were meant 
to service navigation above all else.  The boom company, for instance, held different 
ideas about what the Bay was and what types of labor that it should help facilitate.  As a 
result, Congress took control and created laws that gave the Corps the power to decide 
how best to manage national waterways, ensuring that federal interests would come first.  
Consequently, the judicial and legislative branches gave the federal government an 
enormous amount of power over marine landscapes, effectively legalizing the social 
meaning that they had constructed of these landscapes.  
Unfortunately for Congress and the Corps, the boom incident was only a prelude 
to a larger dispute between those interested in improving the Bay for the sake of 
navigation and those who saw it as a place that facilitated other forms of labor.  As 
Congress and the Corps planned for a larger reengineering of the Bay, new conflicts over 
the Bay and how it should be used would emerge as the rapidly expanding waterfront 
timber processing industries would come to view the Bay as an excellent location to 
dump the vast amount of sawdust that their factories produced.  The manner in which this 
new detriment to navigation was handled by federal officials, and the way in which the 
Refuse Act was successfully employed to halt dumping, is where we will turn.  
                                                
79. Cowdrey, “Pioneering Environmental Law,” 338, 339, 346-349.  Cowdrey discusses the 
difficulties of enforcing Sec. 10. and also how the Refuse Act was reinterpreted by the Nixon 
administration as a permit program.  
57
While the U.S. Supreme Court was determining whether or not the federal government 
had the right to regulate and control the underwater landscape of the Bay, Congress 
charged ahead and planned another navigational improvement.  In 1897, Congress 
instructed the Corps to assess again the major problems that commercial pilots had with 
the harbor and whether other improvements were necessary to help expand commerce.  
The Corps reported that the region’s commerce was generally good and worthy of 
protection.  Surveyors determined that New Whatcom was the largest city north of Seattle 
and that it was the major distributing point for Whatcom, Skagit, Island and San Juan 
Counties.  Unfortunately, the harbor facilities for both sail and steam powered vessels 
were poor because ships found it difficult to reach the northeasterly portions of the harbor 
where the downtown business district resided because of shallow mudflats that were bare 
at low tides.  “The relief that is desired,” wrote a Corps engineer, “is for a channel to be 
dredged from the deep water in toward the city through the mudflats.”  The Corps 
recommended that the sediments in the vicinity of Whatcom Creek, a stream which 
coursed through New Whatcom and emptied into the northeasterly part of the harbor, be 
dredged.  If these tidelands could be successfully deepened, the engineers expected that 
an underwater channel would connect the shoreline with the deeper waters of the Bay.  
The improvement would benefit boats and steamers with drafts of twelve feet or less, 
allowing them to remain at the port facilities at all tides.  This was a major benefit 
because all vessels, no matter how small, had to vacate the terminal before the tide 
receded or otherwise risk grounding.  The cost of Document 80, as the project was often 
referred to, was to be paid for by the government.80         
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Unlike the legal dilemma that mired the Nooksack improvement, the legality of 
Document 80 was not in question because the federal government had already obtained 
authority over certain parts of the northeasterly harbor.  Once Washington achieved 
statehood, the Secretary of War approved a system of abstract harbor lines that cut 
through the mudflats and provided three publicly owned waterways from the shoreline to 
the deeper waters of the Bay.  These waterways are known as Whatcom Creek Waterway, 
I & J Street Waterway and Squalicum Creek Waterway.  (In addition to creating these 
public waterways, the harbor commission also carved up the remaining mudflats into 
abstract lots that were then sold off as private property).81  
After Congress authorized both Document 80 and the improvement of the 
Nooksack River, the Corps learned of new navigational threats posed by timber 
processors.  In 1902, Major John Millis, who was head of the Corps’ recently created 
Seattle District Office, and who was also responsible for planning and overseeing these
new improvements, discovered these threats while conducting surveys.  He found that the 
local lumber mills were using the Bay as a dumping ground for the refuse that their 
factories had created.  Dumping held potential for disrupting navigation because, as the 
Corps learned from local residents, the mixture of sawdust and river sediment quickly 
sank.82  Once he was aware of the extent of dumping, Millis spearheaded a roughly two 
year confrontation with the local mills.  By the end of 1903, he had successfully stopped 
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the practice of dumping, which was necessary if the navigational improvements were to 
be successful in the long term.  
Surprisingly, the Corps showed little concern over sawdust dumping before Millis 
took over the Seattle District Office.  Their survey reports of the 1880s and 1890s did not 
mention much about it.  The only surviving record that mentions anything about dumping 
was not even written by a Corps engineer.  Instead, it was written by Eldridge.  In their 
1892 report to Congress, the Corps included the aforementioned letter authored by this 
prominent resident.  In it, he recommended that “strict laws” be established to halt 
sawdust dumping.  Although his recommendation was forcefully stated, it was a mere 
side note to the primary content of his letter, which was to recommend that the Nooksack 
be diverted.  Aside from this comment, the Corps never explicitly mentioned any concern 
about the impact of dumping on navigation in their reports.83
It is likely that the Corps was not concerned with dumping because the timber 
industry was still in its infancy when army engineers first became acquainted with the 
Bay.  While the City of New Whatcom was originally founded as a mill settlement in the 
1850s, the city’s timber industry did not begin to grow until after 1890.  By 1900, the 
timber industry was maturing rapidly, accounting for much of the economic activity of 
the region.  According to a report from The Evening Herald, a local newspaper, the 
number of lumber mills that operated in the county jumped from six to fifteen between 
1900 and 1903.84  Because the northeasterly harbor improvements coincided with the 
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rapid growth of the timber industry, it is likely that the Corps was unaware of the 
growing practice of sawdust dumping.  
However, the Corps became aware of this expanding industry by 1902 when 
Millis suspected that the local mills were now dumping sawdust into the Bay to the 
degree that it would inhibit the efforts of the Corps to improve the Bay for navigation.  
He consequently took action.  In spite of this new scenario, the Corps did not pull the 
plug on the improvements.  Instead, its engineers vigorously pursued improvements, 
which required them to stop dumpers.  The Corps drew on the newly enacted Refuse Act 
to protect the Bay from dumpers.   
The manner in which the Corps went about enforcing the Refuse Act at 
Bellingham Bay is interesting and worthy of discussing in more detail.  This is because 
historians have been unable to determine how this law was utilized prior to its 
reformulation during the era of the environmental reform.  In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
many had become concerned that the nation’s water quality had worsened.  Those who 
had tried to address this problem were surprised to find that the Corps had long ago 
obtained a powerful mandate to regulate industrial dumpers yet did not use: the Refuse 
Act.  Legal scholars and historians of the time tried to understand better the history of this 
power as politicians and environmentalists pushed the courts to reinterpret it as an anti-
pollution law in addition to its noted function as an anti-obstruction law.  Historian Albert 
Cowdrey, for instance, has successfully researched its origins as well as the origins of 
other anti-obstruction laws.  But Cowdrey has downplayed the importance of this law 
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between the time that it was created and then reinterpreted; he referred to it as merely “a 
minor statute to protect navigation.”85
Part of the reason why the history of the Refuse Act may have seemed 
unimportant to historians prior to its reformulation is because the law was not always 
enforced in typical legal forums, making record of its enforcement seem scant.  At 
Bellingham Bay, the Refuse Act was invoked regularly, and effectively, in the Corps’ 
effort to halt dumping and protect navigation.  But interestingly, the Corps rarely 
attempted to enforce it in the courtroom.  They threatened legal action on a few 
occasions, but formal legal recourse proved unsuccessful.  Instead, the law functioned as 
a “stick” that was used in tandem with “carrots,” such as the various congressional 
appropriations to fund Bay improvements.  By threatening to withhold congressional 
appropriations until the Refuse Act was complied with, the Corps was able to utilize this 
law effectively outside of the courtroom.  Thus, the reason why Cowdrey and others may 
have considered the Refuse Act to be of little importance for so long after its passage was 
because the enforcement of the law did not leave the usual courtroom tracks, at least in 
the case of Bellingham Bay.   
The first action that Millis took against the lumber mills, which proved 
unsuccessful, was to simply write the suspected culprits and request their voluntary 
compliance with the Refuse Act.  One of the earliest responses of which there is record 
came from the Whatcom Falls Mill Co.  In their correspondence with Millis, the Loggie 
Brothers, the mill operators who were leasing Whatcom Falls Mill from the city, openly 
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admitted to dumping and were somewhat antagonistic to any request that they 
discontinue the practice.  The Loggie Brothers were fully aware that dumping was now 
outlawed; however, they carped that compliance would be an undue burden on their 
operations because it would require them to furnish a refuse burner.  This was a cost that 
they were unwilling to pay because they claimed that their lease was already too 
expensive.86  By the end of the correspondence, the Loggie Brothers had conceded 
nothing.  According to Millis’ report to his superiors in Washington D. C., the Loggie 
Brothers offered no alternative to dumping and plainly “desire an indefinite 
postponement of the work of harbor improvement.”87  
The Loggie Brothers’ reaction to Millis’ request was rather extreme in 
comparison to the responses from other mill owners and managers.  Of the records that 
exist, none contained recommendations that Major Millis forgo the improvement.  Those 
that responded were actually cooperative.  They suggested that they were doing one or all 
of the following: complying with the law, halting the practice of dumping and/or 
installing refuse burners.  
While most of the responses seemed to be cordial, it is uncertain if they were 
entirely sincere.  This is because some of the respondents were later caught dumping after 
pledging compliance with the law.  For example, the Bellingham Bay Improvement Co. 
(BBIC), which operated a mill just south of The Whatcom Falls Mills Co., was quick to 
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deny any dumping allegations, claiming instead to be burning all of their refuse.  
Furthermore, the owners of the mill offered to support Millis in his efforts to control 
dumping when they offered to “heartily co-operate” with other local lumber companies to 
“meet all requirements” of the rivers and harbors act that provided congressional funds.88  
Their sincerity was questionable; months later, the Corps caught the BBIC illegally 
dumping into the Bay.89
After his unfruitful correspondence with the Whatcom Falls Mill Co., Millis 
adopted a firmer approach to mill dumping when he requested permission to prosecute 
those mill companies that he believed were violating the law.90  This decision would do 
little to advance his cause because Millis was unable to determine exactly which mills 
were dumping.  Because Millis only had engineers at the Bay to conduct occasional 
surveys, he had only a limited ability to determine which mills were dumping.  As a 
result, the mills were able to flout the Refuse Act and conduct business as usual for most 
of 1902 and 1903.  Consequently, the Whatcom Falls Mill Co. became an easy early 
target for Millis because it was the only mill that he was sure had been dumping.  Also, 
because the Loggie Brothers refused to install a refuse burner, there was nowhere else for 
the sawdust to go except beneath the water; this fact gave Millis the certainty he needed 
to proceed with a suit.  
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In October of 1902, the Whatcom Falls Mills Co. became the first mill company 
that Millis requested U.S. Attorney Jesse A. Frye prosecute in violation of the Refuse 
Act.  The lawsuit, however, was not protracted like other federal cases (such as United 
States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., which took almost ten years to decide) since the mill 
that the Loggie Brothers operated was mostly lost in a fire immediately after the suit 
began.91  There is no mention of foul play, probably since mill fires were common in the 
local lumber and shingle industries.92
Now that the Whatcom Falls Mill Co. was out of the picture, Millis urged Frye to 
prosecute other mill men.  But the mills that Frye threatened with lawsuits were able to 
convince him that they were either not dumping or in the process of installing refuse 
burners and/or bulkheads to their waterfront properties so that sawdust would not reach 
the Bay.93  The Morrison Mill Company was one such mill.  The mill owners responded 
affirmatively to federal requests to construct a refuse burner and to halt dumping.  Frye 
was so satisfied with their outward intimations of compliance that he decided against 
proceeding with prosecution.94  (Ironically, the Morrison Mill Company was also later 
caught dumping into the Bay after making assurances to the contrary.)95    
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During the latter half of 1902, Millis, who was satisfied that compliance had been 
reached, tried to gain a better perspective on the dumping matter.  He sought the help of 
the New Whatcom City Council to accomplish this.  Millis requested that the councilmen
furnish the names of the mills that they believed to be violating the law.96  The council 
had already pledged their support for the harbor improvement, so they were a likely ally 
for Millis—the council went so far as to pass and forward a city resolution to the War 
Department that declared that they would in no way interfere with the improvement.97  
Mayor Ed. E. Hardin offered to help Millis by referring the matter to the city marshal.  
Aside from the Loggie Brothers, the marshal determined that the Bellingham Lumber and 
Shingle Company of the town of Fairhaven was the only mill company illegally dumping.  
The marshal did not rule out the possibility that other mills were dumping, but if they 
were violating the law, they were doing so at night and very quietly.98
Although city officials were quick to help Millis so that they would receive the 
needed appropriation sooner, their zeal to begin the improvement may have shielded 
them from taking an earnest look at their waterfront industries.  Several times during 
1902 and 1903, they urged the Corps to begin the improvement after declaring that all 
dumping had ceased when this was not the case.  An especially poignant city council 
resolution that was passed in February 1903 informed Millis that all of the mills had 
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complied with the law.99  Ironically, on Millis’ next visit to the Bay, he quickly 
discovered sawdust afloat and determined that the sawdust had emanated from the 
recently refashioned Loggie Brothers mill.  This last incidence of dumping seems to have 
been enough for Millis because he rescinded the order to commence the project.100  
Alfred Black, the president of the Fairhaven Commercial Club, who would later become 
a mayor of the City of Bellingham (the communities of Bellingham Bay, aside from the 
Lummi Nation, incorporated in 1904) quickly apologized to Millis in a letter.  He 
explained that the municipal lease of the Loggie Brothers was about to expire and not 
likely to be renewed by the City of New Whatcom, which would end any future Loggie 
Brothers transgressions.  But Black also stressed to Millis that the actions on the part of 
this mill were not representative of the rest of the mills.  Black also claimed to have 
toured all of the mills himself.  Thus, he confidently gave Millis his assurance that the 
rest of the mills were acting within the bounds of the law and that the improvement 
should commence.101  In addition, both the Mayor of New Whatcom and the president of 
this city’s commercial club assured Millis that all dumping had ceased via telegram.102  
But after the latest incidence of dumping, Millis decided to place his own 
inspector at Bellingham Bay.  His reasons for doing so most likely stemmed from his 
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frustrations with local portrayals of mill dumping.  Inspector H. S. Shorey was stationed 
at the Bay and wrote several letters to Millis detailing the activities of the various mills.  
Shorey described plainly the numerous violations that he had witnessed by several 
different mill companies, even those mills that had assured federal agents in the past that 
all dumping had ceased—such as the Morrison and BBIC mill companies.103  His reports 
matter-of-factly contradicted the progress that city leaders and commercial 
representatives had reported to Millis.    
Now that Millis had a clearer picture of mill activities, he could impose stronger 
measures to halt dumping.  Though Millis forwarded Shorey’s letters to U.S. Attorney 
Frye (who was surprised by the reports) prosecution was not necessary this time because 
a steadfast halting of the improvement accomplished Millis’ goal of successful 
enforcement of anti-dumping laws.  Shorey monitored the Bay vigilantly for a few 
months and sent Millis regular updates regarding new dumping violations and the efforts 
of the local mills to refigure their operations so that they could finally comply with the 
law.  After touring the local mills, Shorey began to see progress and recommended that 
the improvement commence, which Millis authorized in late May of 1903.104   
As 1903 closed, the Corps had successfully altered the ways that local mills had 
interacted with the landscape of the Bay.  While some mills occasionally relapsed and 
were caught dumping, these were rare occasions, and likely the result of individual 
laborers occasionally throwing material into the Bay without the permission of mill 
managers.  One such violation occurred when Millis observed refuse being dumped into 
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the Bay by the Morrison Mill Co.  When it was brought to the attention of the mill 
manager, he apologized for the violation and claimed that it was not done on his orders.  
He pledged to have the materials pulled up and disposed of properly.  After this, no more 
incidences of sawdust dumping appear in the records of the Corps.105  Still, to ensure that 
dumping would not reoccur, the Corps inspected both refuse burners and bulkheads to 
make sure that the mills had the capacity to dispose of, or store, the great quantity of 
sawdust that they produced.  This even included a careful probing of the Puget Sound 
Mill & Timber Company (formerly the Puget Sound Saw Mill & Shingle Co.), a mill that 
cooperated the most with the Corps in previous years.106  However, in the end, the mills 
finally accepted the presence of the Corps in their operations and the new ways that they 
were to conduct business, which meant that sawdust would go up in smoke or 
underground rather than beneath the surface of the Bay.
Dredging finally began in late-1903 and ended in mid-1904.  The Corps placed an 
advertisement for bids with local dredging companies.  The Seattle Bridge Co. responded 
with the lowest offer, promising to dredge at the rate of 13 cents per cubic yard of 
sediment removed.  For nearly seven months a crew of forty men lived on the company 
dredge, operating it both day and night until the tidelands adjacent the shoreline were 
either dredged out or filled in.  This was the first of many dredgings that shaped the Bay 
so that it could safely accommodate commercial shipping.107
                                                
105. F. S. Greely, USACE Surveyman, to Maj. John Millis, September 6, 1904, Folder 1, Box 87, 
Letters Recd., SDO, RG 77, NARA-Pacific Alaska Region (SEA).
106. Puget Sound Mills & Timber Co. to Maj. John Millis, March 19, 1904, Folder 1, Box 87, 
Letters Recd., SDO, RG 77, NARA-Pacific Alaska Region (SEA). 
69
The Corps’ victory over sawdust dumpers, however, did not mean that the harbor was 
now safe for future improvements.  Soon after the first dredging had begun, engineers 
learned of other navigational detriments that, ironically, came from the commercial 
vessels that the Corps was engineering the Bay to aid.  The source of the problem was the 
ballast that commercial ships, particularly ocean-going ships, were letting accumulate on 
the Bay bottom.
Surprisingly, the Corps made no mention that ballast might complicate their 
efforts to deepen the Bay in any of their early reports.  However, they must have been 
aware that prior to the advent of water ballast technology all oceangoing ships required 
solid ballast (in the absence of cargo) for stability during travel.  The Corps must also 
have known that when a ship intended to take on new cargo its ballast was typically 
disposed of in the waters near a harbor’s port facilities.  Thus the Corps should have 
expected that their efforts to improve commerce would generate more and more ballast 
that would require disposal.  This oversight, however, came into sharp focus when a ship 
named the Barmbek entered port while the Corps was making plans for another dredging 
to finish the work that they had begun in 1903/1904.  
The Barmbek, a German commercial bark, entered Bellingham Bay in October of 
1904.  Like all ocean going vessels of the time, the Barmbek intended to dump its ballast 
before taking on new cargo.  But before it proceeded with the discharge, the Barmbek’s 
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crew contacted Fred Kimme, Bellingham Bay’s harbormaster, to ascertain where the ship 
should dispose of its ballast.  Unregulated dumping had been the norm in Bellingham 
Bay; therefore, Kimme had no real authority other than to suggest a good place for the 
ballast to be dumped.  According to the Bellingham Herald, when a harbor was without a 
ballast law, it was typical for ship captains to take the suggestions of the harbormaster 
with a grain of salt and dumped wherever they wished.108
Harbormaster Kimme, however, was in an exceptional state when he greeted the 
crew.  Preceding the Barmbek’s arrival, Kimme had for several weeks become more and 
more distressed at the state of the Bay and his lack of authority regarding its uses.  In a 
few interviews with the Bellingham Herald, Kimme expressed his frustrations with his 
lack of authority and the city council’s lack of urgency on the matter of unregulated 
ballast dumping.  According to Kimme, unregulated dumping had created spots in the 
harbor where the depth was only seventeen feet at low tide—a hazardous depth for larger 
ships, which required at times twenty-six feet or more of clearance.109  
It was in this worked up state that Kimme greeted the Barmbek crew; 
consequently, he used the encounter to force a solution to the ballast problem that had 
troubled him.  Instead of admitting to the crew that the Bay was without a dumping 
ground, Kimme referred the crew to surveyman F.S. Greely of the Corps.110  Given 
Kimme’s recent comments, and given the Corps’ stance on mill dumping, it is likely that 
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Kimme suspected that the Corps could accomplish for him what the city council would 
not: greater regulation over matters of ballast dumping.  Greely held about as much 
authority to regulate dumping as Kimme held, so the surveyman involved Major Millis.  
Captain Hansen asked Millis whether or not it would be appropriate for his crew to dump 
the Barmbek’s ballast in a deep portion of the Bay.  Millis agreed to this 
recommendation, and all seemed well, aside from Captain Hansen’s frustration with 
being held up in the harbor while the ordeal was debated.  Unfortunately, Hansen’s crew, 
in the absence of their captain, did not act as planned.  While believing that there was yet 
a deeper portion of the Bay, the crew allowed the ship to drift away from the agreed upon 
location where they then disposed of the ballast.  After hearing of the unanticipated 
change of plans, Greely boarded the ship to investigate.  He measured the location where 
the ballast was thrown overboard and discovered that the water was seven fathoms less 
than the location that was agreed upon.  Many tons of ballast was dumped, further 
threatening navigation.                 
The Barmbek ordeal brought attention to Kimme’s concern: how would the local 
and federal governments reconcile the maintenance of a navigable harbor with the 
necessities of ballast disposal in such a shallow harbor?  When it came to resolving the 
issue over sawdust dumping, the Corps could exercise draconian measures over violators 
because there were conceivable alternatives to dumping, such as burning and 
bulkheading.  But when it came to ship ballast, alternatives were less forthcoming.  Yet, 
what made the situation worse was the more frequent visits that large draft vessels like 
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the Barmbek were making to Bellingham Bay as indicated by commerce reports.  Not 
long after the arrival of the Barmbek, these problems were formally discussed.111  
There was some urgency palpable as a solution was debated as several ships were 
held in limbo while the matter was discussed.  Moreover, there was fear that shipping 
interests would tire of delays and/or become dissatisfied with one of the solutions that 
was being debated, which involved a proposal for a dumping ground that some thought 
would be too far away from the port.  The Bellingham Reveille for instance thought that if 
a ballast zone was created, the rise in city revenue that had occurred, and which was 
attributed to the increase of commercial shipping, would shift to other cities such as Port 
Townsend that did not have dumping ordinances.  Consequently, the prospect of ballast 
regulation stoked fears in the community that economic decline would necessarily 
result.112
In addition to a dumping zone, city officials considered having ballast dumped 
under waterfront buildings and wharves, which had the added benefit of further tideland 
reclamation.  The E. K. Wood Lumber Co. and the BBIC were the first property owners 
to employ this solution—a rather easy one owing to the fact that many of the mills had 
already bulkheaded their properties to hold back sawdust and other mill refuse.  
Unfortunately, bulkheads would not solve all of the ballast problems because many ships 
would not reach the portions of the port where these bulkheads could be found. 
In the end, the creation of a designated ballast dumping ground gained favor in 
spite of its noted criticism.  The city council debated and passed several ordinances that 
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stipulated the appropriate depth and location for the dumping of ballast; this body also 
determined the corresponding fines that would be levied against violators.  The efficacy 
of these ordinances, however, depended on whether or not the Corps would assent to a 
dumping ground because its engineers ultimately held authority over the Bay and its uses 
because of the Refuse Act.  J. J. Donavon (general manager of the BBIC) and J. W. 
Romaine (the mayor of Bellingham) forwarded the proposals to Millis for review.113  
Millis agreed with the proposal and forward it on to his superiors in Washington D.C. for 
their final approval, which they granted shortly thereafter.114
Although the Corps and the city council were able to devise an acceptable 
solution to the ballast problem, the episode demonstrates that improving the Bay for 
navigation was not an easy task.  By itself, the ballast issue was not problematic enough 
to halt Bay improvements.  But it should be apparent by now that the ballast problem was 
but one item on a growing laundry list of navigational deterrents.  Yet, in the face of 
these mounting problems, the Corps showed no sign of tiring because they continued to 
plan new improvements.  Not only did the Corps finish Document 80, they initiated new 
surveys of the harbor with the intent of making it serve ever larger vessels, a topic which 
will be discussed below.  
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After the sawdust ordeal had been settled, and while the matter of ballast was being 
discussed, the Corps would find another reason to police dumping at Bellingham Bay.  
This time it was the city, ironically, that broke ranks.  Following the initial dredging of 
1903/1904, the non-Native communities of Bellingham Bay, which had recently 
incorporated as the City of Bellingham, were caught violating the law by dumping 
municipal trash into the harbor.  Surveyman Greeley, who had discovered the 
wrongdoing, promptly informed Millis of the offense.115      
The council’s decision to dump seems quite strange given that municipal officials 
had supported the Corps while Millis had dealt with other forms of dumping.  But this 
new transgression was not without reason.  Nowadays, Bellingham’s municipal garbage 
is sufficiently out-of-sight and out-of-mind.  It is picked up by garbage trucks, shipped to 
transfer stations and loaded onto trains where the garbage reaches its final destination in a 
sparsely populated county in southern Washington State.  Upon arriving, the waste is 
buried in enormous holes, which are lined and guaranteed not to leak for several 
decades.116  Earlier residents of Bellingham did not have this luxury.  As the city grew, 
and efforts to sell it as a place beneficial for commerce and industry expanded, its 
garbage grew as well.  City leaders, who were always concerned about what visitors and 
potential investors might think of their city, attempted to do something about the  
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unsightly trash that had accumulated, for example, on empty lots in the city.  For a short 
time, dumping seemed to be the answer.117  
Millis, however, did not think that this decision was wise.  According to one 
newspaper report, Millis “strenuously” objected to the plan.  His objections, while they 
were not explicitly stated, were likely because he feared that the refuse would eventually 
disrupt navigation.118
The violation was small in comparison to the other forms of the dumping that 
were occurring contemporaneously.  But the Bellingham Reveille was particularly 
concerned that if the city did not move proactively the Corps might not complete 
Document 80, which still required another round of dredging.  The editors therefore 
recommended that an alternative to dumping be devised by the city council.119  The city 
searched hard for another solution, an effort that took its officials north to the City of 
Vancouver, B.C. and to Europe where they sought to learn better ways of managing 
waste from other municipalities.120  Eventually, the city decided to create landfills near 
the waterfront that protected garbage from reaching the Bay.  As a result of this ordeal, 
the shoreline (and not the Bay) would house municipal trash for much of the twentieth 
century.     
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When Document 80 was finally completed in 1906, the Corps had come a long way in 
their effort to make Bellingham Bay into a feature of nature that could serve commercial 
shippers.  This required them to regulate all sorts of activities.  However, their only 
failure was to gain the entire support of the community.  Many visitors and residents of 
Bellingham welcomed the changes ambivalently at best.  While the city council 
championed the improvements (more or less) mill owners and ship captains became 
frustrated with the regulations imposed on dumping—even the city council revealed its 
frustration with this policy when it was also forced to halt Bay dumping.  To these sorts 
of people, the Bay was more than simply a place for big boats: it was a dump.      
Given this ambivalence, it is surprising to find that during the period between the 
initial dredging and the end of the Great Depression—a period of time when the Corps 
had gradually relaxed its efforts to improve the Bay—local interests would push for 
future harbor improvements with even more determination than the Corps.  The 
remainder of this chapter will examine when and why the people of Bellingham began to 
alter their stance on harbor improvements.    
As soon as the dredger arrived and began excavating Whatcom Creek Waterway, 
some of the issues that people had with the strict regulatory measures subsided.  The 
dredger, a relatively new technology, may have been responsible.  While it opened up the 
waterway for vessels of varying sizes, the dredger also made possible new ways of 
thinking about the Bay.  The dredger showed the people of Bellingham that their Bay 
could be utilized to make valuable waterfront land.  These ideas began to surface while 
the Corps started work on Document 80.  
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This changing appreciation for the Bay resulted in part because of a minor 
stipulation of the improvement: in order for the improvement to commence, engineers 
had to find a place to deposit the large amount of material that they expected to remove 
from the Bay floor.  The adjacent tidelands, which were privately owned, was an obvious 
first choice.  The Corps asked the owners of these tidelands to permit the dredging 
company to dispose of the sediments on their lots, which was granted (had the property 
owners demurred, the Corps fully intended to have the sediments placed on scows and 
dumped in deeper waters so that it would not do any harm to navigation).  But as soon as 
the improvement got under way, many in the community saw the possibility of modifying 
the improvement from a purely navigational scheme into a means of making land.  The 
landfilling ambitions of local residents became evident when the Seattle Bridge Company 
made the necessary disposal arrangements.  The dredging company learned that the 
tideland owners would not only agree to the request, but that they would even pay the 
company for any additional sediments that could be excavated below the approved 
project depth.  Having seen a chance to make an unexpected further profit, the Seattle 
Bridge Co. asked the Corps for permission to enter into private contracts with tideland 
owners.121  An astute engineer named D. W. McMorris had realized that another dredging 
would be required to complete Document 80, so he recommended that the sale commence 
because the federal government would save money and come closer to finishing the 
project if the company was allowed to dredge for additional profit.122  
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Local newspaper reports lauded these landfilling efforts, claiming that once the 
mudflats were “reclaimed,” tideland properties could be used for such things as new 
factories.  Even George Loggie of the Whatcom Falls Mill Co., who had once been a 
detractor of the improvement, now praised the dredging; not incidentally, twenty-five 
acres of his company’s tidelands were to be reclaimed through dredging.123  The city 
council also entered the landfilling frenzy.  They speculated that if the federal 
government proposed future navigational improvements, they should seriously consider 
filling their municipal property near the mouth of Whatcom Creek.124  Almost overnight, 
the Corps’ requirement that mill owners bulkhead their properties to prevent refuse from 
entering the Bay began to look less like a burden and more like a profitable investment in 
property.
Landfilling was so attractive that local residents welcomed further navigational 
improvements because it meant that more land could be reclaimed.  And when the Corps 
planned a more ambitious and longer lasting improvement of Whatcom Creek Waterway, 
it looked as though the government would again subsidize these goals.  Unfortunately, 
the win-win scenario of the first two dredgings (of 1903/1904 and 1905/1906) did not 
easily transfer over to the eventual dredging of 1913.  This was because the Corps and 
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local residents shared different conceptions of what the improvement was intended to 
accomplish: landfill or navigation.  As a result, plans to maintain and to continue 
reengineering the Bay almost failed to continue.  
Major Hiram Chittenden was responsible for planning the first of many 
improvements that aimed to improve and protect Bellingham Bay specifically for deep 
draft commercial uses (whereas before, the improvements were designed for shallower
draft vessels).  Chittenden’s legacy is known to many in the Pacific Northwest, especially 
to the residents of Seattle because he endorsed many important improvements in this 
city—his most recognized achievement was the locks of Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood 
(part of the larger Lake Washington Ship Canal improvement) which bears his name.125  
But Chittenden’s influence has extended beyond the Seattle city limits.  After personally 
inspecting Bellingham Bay and attending a public meeting to garner the views of 
Bellingham residents, Chittenden proposed a new improvement that would expand upon 
the vision of House Document 80 and shape the Bay into a commercial port that could 
berth deep draft vessels in addition to the smaller commercial vessels that had made use 
of the harbor.  The plan, which was eventually approved by the Chief of Engineers and 
Secretary of War, and funded by Congress, was published as House Document 1161.  
Document 1161 was the official framework that guided federal decisions regarding the 
Bay for roughly half a century (though it became less strictly adhered to after the onset of 
the Great Depression; see Chapter 3).  Originally, the plan he proposed called for 
Whatcom Creek Waterway to be dredged to a depth of 26 feet below mean low tide.  But 
in subsequent years, the Corps and the Port of Bellingham (which had been established in 
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the 1920s) would modify Document 1161 so that it provided for the improvement of 
other parts of Bellingham Bay.126
Despite the positive reaction that Chittenden received during the public meeting 
he attended in 1907, local support for his improvement languished in the following years.  
The weakening enthusiasm likely resulted from certain stipulations of Document 1161—
this time the federal government required that local residents, and not taxpayers, pay for 
the construction of bulkheads to hold back the fillings.  They were also required to pay 
for a portion of the fill as well.  While tideland property owners had no qualms with these 
stipulations upon learning of them at the meeting in 1907, they claimed that they were too 
much of a financial burden when the improvement was about to commence a few years 
later.  The Corps—which knew full well by this point that the tideland owners desired the 
fill as much, if not more, than they did a navigable Bay—held firm and maintained that 
these stipulations be complied with before any federal funds were expended.  One reason 
that engineers did not budge was because they knew that if Chittenden’s ambitious and 
costly proposal was to be worthwhile, permanent bulkheads would be needed to hold 
back the fill from re-entering the waterway.127  At the last minute, the Bellingham Bay 
Improvement Co. (BBIC) salvaged the project by offering to construct the necessary 
bulkheads if the sediments were placed on their property.  The Corps saw no problem 
with this proposal and it looked as though the improvement was ready to commence.  
All seemed well when the city council unexpectedly challenged the BBIC’s right 
to the fill.  In a resolution, the council declared that public fillings should precede any 
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private fillings.  The city’s challenge resulted from its wish to fill the mouth of Whatcom 
Creek in the vicinity northeast of Holly Street, a trestle which crossed the creek—they 
devised this plan nearly a decade earlier.128  After the unexpected announcement, the 
BBIC and the city council prepared to fight for the dirt.  
There was a lot at stake; had this fight occurred, it would have delayed the 
beginning of the project and, as a result, Congress would have likely opposed authorizing 
the second half of the appropriation that was expected to come from the following year’s 
rivers and harbor act.  Furthermore, this second appropriation was so vital to the project 
that the Corps would not have, in all likelihood, pursued the improvement—a fact that 
BBIC officials were very concerned about, as indicated by an internal correspondence.129  
This confrontation, which turned out to be a short one, is interesting because it 
demonstrates that there were still lingering disagreements about the goal of improving the 
Bay.  For instance, when the council tried to obtain the fill, the BBIC complained to the 
Corps that “city authorities in their zeal to improve [their] real estate…[have] lost sight of 
the spirit of the act,” which was navigation.  Company officials, on the other hand, told 
the Corps that they construed the “spirit” to be purely navigational in nature.  “The act,” 
as one company official wrote to a Corps engineer, “does not contemplate the 
improvement by filling except as an incident to the development of shipping and 
commerce in Bellingham harbor for which latter purpose the Waterway is to be 
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dredged.”130  But these statements were likely not representative of how the BBIC truly 
saw the goals of the improvement.  Outwardly, they stressed navigation; but internally 
they valued the dredged material as landfill just as much as the city.  Furthermore, the 
BBIC would have filled their properties whether the navigational improvement was to go 
forward or not.  However, the government appropriation made their goal more cost 
effective.  As a result, they desired, in their words, to “take the dirt at this time,” rather 
than later.131  The Corps was the only entity that truly stressed the importance of 
navigation as the central goal of the improvement, while the actions of local interests 
demonstrate that they were more interested in filling tidelands.
Luckily for the BBIC and the Corps, a technical difficultly made it impossible for 
the council to pay for the fill.  The factor that determined that fill should be placed on 
BBIC lands, and not city property, was that the city wanted the material moved as far as 
3,000 feet from the waterway.  Unfortunately, the dredging technology of the time could 
not accomplish this feat alone and other modes of transporting the material such a
distance would have been required, which would have greatly increased the cost.  As a 
result, the council put their landfilling ambitions on hold and the fill was placed on BBIC 
lands (later the city would accomplish their goals and fill these lands).  The dredging 
commenced and was completed in 1913.132
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Clearly, this episode demonstrates that federal officials saw something quite 
different than the local community when the former looked upon the Bay.  They saw a 
Bay with navigable channels and waterborne commerce that brought down rail costs.  
However, the local community, which first saw the Bay as a convenient dump, were 
amazed at the Bay’s capacity to create relatively cheap fill.  While these differing ideas 
about the Bay were compatible in 1903/1904 and 1905/1906, by 1913 it was a tenuous 
compromise that could just have easily been a loss for all parties.  
For a time following the 1913 dredging, the presence of the Corps at Bellingham Bay was 
less pronounced.  Aside from the minor maintenance that was necessary to protect the 
completed improvements, the Corps did not see fit to propose any adjuncts to House 
Document 1161 immediately after the dredging.  
In the absence of the Corps, local residents earnestly bought into the idea of 
improving the Bay for navigation, and not merely as a means of making land.  One 
example that demonstrates this sincere appreciation for navigation involves a public vote 
authorizing the Port of Bellingham in 1920.  The new commission placed navigability as 
one of their key priorities.  Their grandiose blueprints for further improvements, which 
they made available to the Corps, are point to this desire (see figure three).133   The Port 
Commission made good on their promises of improving the Bay when they dredged and 
re-dredged parts of Whatcom Creek Waterway further, to a depth of 35 feet below mean 
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low water.134  They also looked to other parts of the Bay, such as the previously 
undeveloped Squalicum Creek Waterway, as a means of relieving the commercial 
pressure on the principal port of the Bay.  The Port Commission purchased portions of 
the waterfront near Squalicum Creek and began construction of a deep draft shipping 
terminal.  Also, a turning basin was dredged to a depth of 26 feet at mean low water to 
facilitate deep draft traffic.  This improvement originally began without federal aid; but 
by the onset of the Great Depression, the Port Commission had accumulated a debt of 
400,000 dollars while trying to dredge the waterway to a suitable depth.135  One Corps 
engineer praised the efforts of local residents, claiming that they have “shown their faith 
in the proposed development by the expenditure of a considerable sum in the acquisition 
of property and the initiation of work.”  Furthermore, Corps engineers were impressed 
enough that they recommend that Congress allow them to complete the Squalicum Creek 
Waterway improvement by dredging an underwater channel that connected the turning 
basin and the deeper waters of the Bay.  Later, Congress incorporated the Squalicum 
Creek Waterway improvements under the framework of House Document 1161, which 
made Corps engineers responsible for maintaining the waterway.  In addition to finishing 
the improvement, Congress ordered the Corps to protect the newly filled port facilities
from the actions of the tides by constructing a large breakwater, which required the costly 
importation of many tons of boulders from other parts of the Puget Sound.136
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The port commission also made a case for redirecting the Nooksack River into 
Lummi Bay in order to promote waterborne commerce.  Just before the Great 
Depression, the port implicated the sediments from the Nooksack as a problem for 
navigation and urged the Corps (unsuccessfully) to consider diverting this river (an idea 
that a previous generation had considered; see chapter one).  Though the Corps assessed 
this claim, they disagreed with the port commission’s conclusions.137  The Corps likely 
considered Whatcom and Squalicum Creeks the source of the sedimentation—an 
argument that they used during the 1950s (see chapter 3)—and that maintenance dredging 
was the proper solution (because the report was unpublished the Corps’ exact reasoning 
is unclear).  Interestingly, subsequent research has revealed that the Port of Bellingham 
was correct when its commissioners argued that the Nooksack had become a problem for 
navigation.  Curtis Ray Smelser, who produced a master’s thesis on the rate of 
sedimentation, has convincingly demonstrated that the Nooksack River was the source of 
shoaling, particularly after 1900 when the timber industry grew substantially.138  
Regardless, the initiation and maintenance of Bay improvements reveals that the people 
of Bellingham (through an organization which was established by the public) were very 
concerned about the state of the Bay and desired to protect it as a feature of nature that 
was conducive for navigation and not simply as a means of making land.  
                                                
137. House, Bellingham Harbor, Wash., 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, H. Doc. 558, 11. The actual 
survey was never published, and my research has yet to uncover an unpublished copy of it.  The 
conclusions, however, are summarized in the report cited here. 
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Nooksack River Basin.  
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By now it should be clear that the human impact on Bellingham Bay is very complex.  By 
the onset of World War II, Bellingham Bay had undergone much environmental change.  
Some of these changes were the result of natural processes that predate the arrival of 
humans, such as the growth of the Nooksack River Delta.  Other changes were made 
unintentionally by humans.  Again, the building up of the Delta through upstream land 
use choices is an example of this.  
But the human induced changes were also intentionally caused.  The Bay was 
once managed and shaped intensively—tributaries were cleared, channels were dredged 
and tidelands were filled—and it should rightfully be considered a type of hybrid 
landscape.  At their core, these changes flowed from quite clear conceptions about what 
activities the Bay should serve, which were then literally embedded into the Bay’s 
underwater landscape.  
These changes are particularly interesting because they brought different people, 
who often had different ideas about the Bay, into conflict.  These struggles were 
inextricably tied to the underwater landscape.  For instance, the goals of the Corps 
(navigation) and the goals of the local lumber companies (dumping) were mutually 
exclusive—when one person changed the Bay, another was necessarily worse for wear.
Amidst a changing landscape and different, often competing, understandings of 
this marine environment, some were able to obtain more power to remake the Bay to their 
liking than were others.  The federal government, for instance, worked assiduously to 
obtain control of the Bay.  Through the creation and enforcement of anti-obstruction 
legislation, the government’s leading agent, the Corps, was able to control the landscape 
and how it was used and changed.
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Local residents came to except the rules that Congress and the Corps had 
legislated.  There is even evidence that many adopted the federal governments notions 
about the Bay and how it should be used, as was finally evident by compliance with anti-
dumping laws and the public efforts to create another deep draft terminal.  Regardless, a 
relatively lasting consensus had been struck between leaders from the federal and local 
levels: the underwater landscape was to be treated with care and left unobstructed for 
deep draft shipping.  
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Chapter Three
The Decline of the Bay Consensus
The consensus that had been negotiated between Congress and the Corps on the 
one hand and local residents on the other, and which held that navigation was the Bay’s 
most essential function, had unraveled as time went on.  It has crumbled to the extent that 
the Bay does not hold nearly the same types of meaning for present-day residents as it did 
for previous generations.  For newer residents, the Bay is a place for maturing salmon 
and for people to recreate, not an environment that should be strictly maintained for 
commercial vessels above all else.  This chapter will examine how the Bay, which had 
been shaped and regulated for so specific a purpose as commercial shipping, came to be 
managed along different lines as different interests attempted to take control of the
underwater landscape and give it new types social meanings as well as new physical 
characteristics.
The Corps, as in the past, played an important part in these changes.  
Interestingly, it is the Corps’ flagging interest in Bellingham Bay that allowed others to 
move in and take control of the harbor and apply new meaning to its underwater
landscape.
The Corps’ interest in re-engineering Bellingham Bay began to wane as early as 
1909.  An example of this occurred when the upstream communities of Ferndale and 
Lynden tried to convince the Corps (unsuccessfully) that the Nooksack River would 
facilitate a larger amount of commerce if it could be improved further.  
While the Nooksack River Delta was where navigational improvements were first 
made by engineers, the Corps was ultimately disappointed that their most recent 
89
improvement of 1902 was not followed by increased commercial activity.  Major C. W. 
Kutz, Chittenden’s replacement as the head of the Seattle District Office, conducted a 
post-improvement survey of the river to assess the situation.  
As part of his assessment, Kutz met with the people of Ferndale and Lynden at 
respective public meetings.  At these public gatherings, Kutz determined that these 
communities still desired more river improvements.  Specifically, they wanted the Corps 
to make the Nooksack delta passable not only at high tide but also at low tide as well.  To 
entice Kutz, they offered the usual reason why the Corps should undertake this project: 
further improvements would bring down freight rates.  
But Kutz objected to their proposal because the river had carried only a slight 
amount of commerce since the last improvement, most of which was floated timber 
products, not steamer traffic.  Furthermore, shingles, which were the major commodity 
that was floated downriver by this time, were loaded onto trains at Bellingham Bay and 
shipped back east.  Kutz did not see this practice changing even if the river was made 
passable at all tides; therefore, he chose not to recommend the improvement since 
navigation would only have a marginal impact on the shipping rates from Lynden and 
Ferndale to Bellingham.139
Interestingly, there were benefits to be had if the proposed improvement was 
completed.  Kutz recognized that the improvement would have an “indirect” benefits—
which is to say, non-navigational benefits—for the farmers that lived along the river since 
it would improve drainage and reduce the likelihood of future flood damages.  Kutz 
recognized that the farmers of the basin had made an unknown amount of river 
                                                
139. House, Nooksak [sic] River to Lynden, Wash., 61st Cong., 2d sess., 1909, Document No. 414.
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improvements, at an equally unknown cost, in their efforts to battle the annual floods.   
But he did not consider the problem of flooding important enough, in his words, to 
“warrant a radical improvement of the mouth of the Nooksack River.”140  
But things were changing.  Before the Great Depression, the federal government 
had slowly altered its position on flood control along the Nooksack, as they had with 
other national watersheds.  Chittenden, who had been instrumental in the planning the 
Bellingham Bay improvement of 1913, was responsible for some of these changing 
sentiments.  In an influential paper submitted to Congress in 1896, Chittenden—who had 
once been an opponent of flood control—became a champion of national flood control 
policy.141  Later, during the early years of the twentieth century, Chittenden’s ideas 
slowly became national policy after several flood control acts had been passed between 
1917 and 1928.142  
This changing national policy is evident at Bellingham Bay too.  During the 
1920s, the Committee on Indian Affairs sought to reclaim Lummi Reservation lands, 
which lay near the mouths of both the Nooksack and Lummi Rivers.  These lands were of 
little or no agriculture value as they were prone to river and tidal flooding.  But if these 
lands were protected from flood waters, the committee assumed that they could be turned 
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141. Klingle, Emerald City, 69.
142. Karen M. O’Neill, Rivers by Design: State Power and the Origins of U. S. Flood Control
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into valuable agricultural plots.143  Even though the committee made no mention that the 
improvement would aid (or hinder) navigation, the War Department permitted the Indian 
Reclamation Service to improve flood control measures along the Nooksack River—a 
remarkable position change given that the department disapproved of a similar measure 
nearly twenty years prior when upstream residents listed this as an auxiliary benefit to the 
proposed commercial improvement.  With the blessing of the War Department,
reclamation service engineers made the Nooksack River the permanent terminus of 
Bellingham Bay through the construction of a dam that blocked the Nooksack (and its 
silt) from ever again turning into Lummi Bay.144
 Or so the engineers thought.  This improvement was not as permanent as the 
dam-builders had envisioned it to be.  In the fall of 1949, the regional director of the 
Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) personally inspected the dam and concluded that it would 
not withstand another season of flooding.145  His prediction was correct; in January of 
1950 an ice jam created a back-up in the river that was finally relieved when the dam 
burst and created a fifty foot hole that allowed the Nooksack to flow down into Lummi 
Bay.146
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The diversion created quite a stir in the region, as could have been expected.  The 
OIA, for instance, was very anxious to have the Corps repair the dam quickly; they feared 
that heavy spring rains would cause more damage to the farms within the Lummi Diking 
District unless it was rebuilt.147  Unfortunately, the Corps was unable to provide the 
resources necessary to fix it until later in the year.148
But this lapse in time provided other local residents time to interpret the broken 
dam differently than had the OIA.  Some viewed it as an opportunity rather than an 
unfortunate event.  For instance, the farmers below the dam welcomed the breach and 
recommended that the dam not be rebuilt since the diversion protected their property 
from flood damages.  The diversion provided these farmers with another outlet for the 
Nooksack River during times of flooding.  Seventy-nine owners of agricultural land near 
the break, but outside the Lummi Diking District, forwarded this argument in a petition to 
U.S. Senators Warren Magnusson and Harry Cain, as well as to U.S. Congressman Henry 
Jackson.  Senator Magnusson forwarded these complaints on to Colonel E. C. Itschner, 
the head of the Seattle District Office, for review.149  
Officials for the City of Bellingham and Whatcom County also saw an 
opportunity as a result of the dam breach.  They petitioned the Corps to stop the 
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Nooksack’s silt from impeding navigation at Bellingham harbor.  In March of 1950, they 
formed a committee comprised of city councilmen as well as port and county 
commissioners.  The tripartite committee requested that the Corps conduct a public 
meeting on the matter.  Although the correspondences between the committee and Corps 
do not explicitly mention a rerouting of the Nooksack away from Bellingham Bay, this 
was likely implied because the port had made this argument in the past.150   
After Corps engineers had considered all of the different arguments, they decided 
to reconstruct the dam and so prevent further damages to the Lummi Diking District.  In a 
letter addressed to Representative Jackson, Colonel Itschner discussed the reasons behind 
his recommendation: the lands, roads and bridges within the diking district needed to be 
protected above all else.151  
The Corps made concessions to some of those that opposed reconstructing the 
dam, but not all.  Those farmers that resided outside the Lummi Diking District would 
enjoy some flood relief because the proposed dam would include a spillway, allowing for 
some of the seasonal flood waters to escape through the Lummi River.152  The ad hoc 
shipping commission, however, was not aided by the decision; the Corps refused even to 
hold a public meeting on the matter of sedimentation.  Furthermore, they only offered to 
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institute silt control measures if it could be accomplished as an incidence to flood 
control.153  Since flood control measures required that the Nooksack continue to empty 
into Bellingham Bay, commercial shipping interests had no recourse but to accept the 
consequence of sedimentation.  
The Corps’ decision to favor flood control over commercial shipping represents 
an interesting and dramatic shift in its priorities.  The Corps no longer championed 
commercial shipping above all other uses of the Bay.  Instead, the priorities of the Corps 
had flipped, as they chose to protect commercial agriculture, through flood control 
measures, over commercial shipping.  
The consequences to commercial shipping were severe.  The Corps received 
several complaints about the shallowing of Whatcom Creek Waterway over the years.  As 
early as 1928, the Port of Bellingham had begun forwarding complaints regarding the 
shallowing of this waterway to Corps engineers.  In this year, a port engineer passed a 
message on to the Corps about a verbal “kicking” that he was forced to endure from a Mr. 
Hough who represented the Shell Oil Company.  Hough, upset that certain steamship 
lines had informed him that they would no longer port at Bellingham Bay because of the 
risk of grounding, inquired about the status of a redredging.154  These types of complaints 
continued to collect when in June of 1952 (after the Corps refused to redirect the river) 
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Corps engineers were met with a more forceful and unified complaint by shipping 
interests in the form of a poignant letter written by Alex Halstead of the Puget Sound 
Pilots.  He requested that the Seattle District Office dredge the waterway back to the 
project depth of 26 feet because his association had received complaints from pilots that 
had suffered damage there as a result of shoaling.  The Port of Bellingham also contacted 
the Corps and claimed that they had received several complaints from shipping interests 
regarding the shallowing of the waterway as well.  The port feared that if nothing were 
done, then certain shipping interests would cease calling on the port.155  Their fears 
slowly came true as commercial shipping has declined throughout the century.  While 
factors such as the construction of Interstate 5 in the 1960s likely played a part, it is clear 
that environmental constraints were responsible for this decline as sedimentation troubled 
those commercial shippers that tried to use the dredged portions of the Bay between 
roughly 1913 through the midcentury.  
But ecological change was not the only reason for this decline.  It was the Corps’ 
surprising lack of interest in maintaining and surveying the Bay that proved to be the 
most important factor behind this decline.  The Bay, which the Corps had obtained so 
much power to regulate, became an afterthought to engineers.  Their priorities had 
changed; flood control along the Nooksack River was their new pet project.  Instituting 
flood control measures, however, had a negative effect on their prior navigational 
improvements.  Had they been concerned enough with harbor shoaling and heeded the 
warnings of city and county officials, they certainly would have been aware of the
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accumulation of silt on the Bay floor.  Regardless, it is a rare sight these days to see a 
fully loaded commercial vessel coming in and out of the Bay.
While the Corps loosened its grip over the Bay, others sought to undermine the Bay 
consensus and alter the physical geography of the harbor in a more dramatic and 
intentional way.  A probing of the aforementioned public meeting of 1946—a meeting
that was introduced at the beginning of this essay—will show how the consensus was 
further undermined.
As World War II came to a close, Congress, the Corps and local residents began 
to raise concerns about the value of their earlier efforts to improve the Bay.  The House 
Committee on Rivers and Harbors responded to these concerns by initiating a formal 
discussion about the Bay in 1944.  The committee subsequently gave the Corps the task 
of reviewing the existing project (House Document 1161 and all of its various add-ons) 
with the possibility of modifying it.156  As a condition of this review, the Corps hosted a 
public meeting to gather a more detailed account of local views regarding the future of 
their Bay.  
At this meeting, the Corps learned that many local residents desired that the 
federal government fund the construction of a small boat basin in the harbor.  This plan
was finally approved by Congress in 1952, and the basin was constructed in the 
previously improved Squalicum Creek Waterway.      
The decision to construct a small boat basin is fascinating because in order to 
construct it part of the terminal that had been dredged and maintained for deep draft 
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vessels would need to be undeveloped.  But more generally, this decision diverges from 
several decades of consensus, which held that the Bay should serve deep draft commerce 
above all else.  At the meeting, city residents voiced their concerns about the social 
changes that were occurring in the region and that were making the prior Bay 
improvements out-of-date.  Their hope was that a small boat basin would channel these 
changes into new sources of economic growth.
The public meeting of 1946 got off to a very slow start; none of the Port 
Commissioners had arrived on time and many of the attendees were reluctant to voice 
their concerns, even despite the prodding of Mayor of Bellingham Arthur Howard, who 
acted in a dual role as a participant and meeting facilitator.  But after a short time this 
reticence gave way to a lively and often impassioned discussion about the benefits that a 
small boat basin would bring to the community.  The perspectives of those that spoke in 
favor of the improvement were many, ranging from railroad officials to local labor 
organizations.157     
Many voiced concerns that the city’s industrial base was declining and that 
something needed to replace the types of jobs that had been lost as a result.  Alvin 
Anderson of the Bellingham Yacht Club spoke to these concerns, perhaps 
overdramatically, when he claimed that on his way to the meeting he had stopped to “sign 
termination slips for 200 men who [had] been released from the Bellingham Iron Works 
from lack of work.”  His comments were meant to underscore the urgency of determining 
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a new direction for the local economy and how the Bay was to play a part. Many other 
attendees were specifically concerned that big timber, which had been the region’s largest 
industry and employer, was the root of the problem and that other industries needed to be 
nurtured to fill its void.  For instance, Nick Costanti, representing the Fishing Boat 
Owners Association, spoke to this concern when he went on the record to state that 
“Today, our lumber is dwindling. Our main stay is the farmer and the fisherman.”158  
Those who had blamed the decline of timber for the region’s economic woes were 
largely right.  While timber had been the keystone industry of the region up through the 
1920s, it had begun to decline after 1925 when the Nooksack River Basin had become 
heavily deforested.  Deforestation was pronounced by 1945 as ninety percent of the 
valley’s forests had been replaced with farms.  Costanti’s concern about the timber 
industry was well timed and likely related to the fact that only one of the large sawmills 
that had previously doted the shoreline remained open in 1946.  Although the timber 
industry would rebound slightly after 1950, there was much concern regarding the fate of 
the region’s economic future in the immediate postwar years.159
The timber industry was not only important to the regional economy, but it was 
also the industry, more than any other, that used the Bay as a commercial space.  
Commercial statistics show that wood and paper products made up the bulk of all 
incoming and outgoing shipments.160  As the declining timber industry and global 
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economic depression worked their way through the economy of Bellingham Bay, a 
noticeable and steady decrease in the tonnage and draft of vessels is evident.161  The 
result was that the Bay, which had seen substantial investments, was dramatically 
underutilized.  
 In response to this evolving economic scenario, Costanti offered a different 
vision for future economic growth when he went on to declare that “we can improve the 
conditions for the fisherman and induce more to come here….”162  By the 1940s the 
fishing industry had rebounded slightly after witnessing declining catches during the 
1920s and 1930s; the fall resulted from various causes, such as overfishing and 
damming.163  Some at the meeting, like Costanti, saw the rising catches as an 
encouraging sign and advocated improving the Bay to induce more fishermen to 
permanently base their operations out of Bellingham.  
Fisherman had avoided the Bay in the past because there was not enough safe 
moorage.  Fred Elsethagen, who represented the Boat Owners Association, described the 
moorage facilities for small vessels as “temporary and inadequate,” as well as “dangerous 
to an extreme condition.”164  While captains of large ships had always found Bellingham 
Bay attractive due to the security it offered their boats during storms, the harbor’s 
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relatively calm waters could not protect the smaller and thus more vulnerable fishing 
vessels from excessively stormy weather.  And many storms had pounded the temporary 
small boat moorages, inflicting costly damages.  In 1943, for instance, a storm hit and 
sank seven moored boats.  But one particularly bad storm occurred the year following the 
meeting, demonstrating just how vulnerable these moorage facilities were.  The storm hit 
the temporary boat haven of south Bellingham in January of 1947 and damaged forty-
four boats, sinking most of them.  The haven was subsequently abandoned.165  
Since the Bay was without proper moorage facilities, there was concern at the 
meeting that the region would not benefit from the increasing catches that they were 
anticipating from the efforts of the International Salmon Commission.  If salmon 
restoration was successful, the attendees saw an opportunity for reinvigorating the local 
economy by basing it around commercial fishing in a way that it had not been in the past.  
Costanti explained this best when he commented that “on these boats, it takes from eight 
to nine men to operate them.  When you stop and think that the average fisherman has 
two or three children, that means there is 30 people making a living from the boat.”166  
Although many commercial fisherman frequented the Bay in order to have their catches 
processed, very few fishing boat owners made Bellingham Bay their permanent harbor 
due to the shortage of adequate moorage—most commercial fisherman berthed their 
vessels further south of Bellingham Bay at Seattle or Everett.  As a result, Costanti 
voiced fears that the larger economic benefits of a renewed commercial fishery would not 
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ripple out into the community unless these facilities were constructed.  Some attendees 
were optimistic that many commercial fishers would relocate to Bellingham Bay once 
moorage facilities were made available because Bellingham Bay had the advantage of 
being roughly ten hours closer to popular fishing grounds, such as the Hackett Straits, 
than Seattle.167  There was good reason for this optimism.  Already by 1946, Bellingham 
Bay had attracted fishing boats from other regions to berth permanently at Bellingham—
by that time seventy-one fishing vessels had made Bellingham Bay home, which was up 
from only twenty-one in 1938.168  If suitable moorage were made available, many at the 
meeting expected that this already increasing figure would explode and the local 
economy would further stabilize around a stronger commercial fishing economy. 
The attendees more or less agreed that better moorage was needed if commercial 
fishermen were to help stabilize the local economy, and most wholeheartedly endorsed 
the construction of a small boat basin to that end.  But others offered a different and more 
controversial reason why a small boat basin should be constructed.  This argument held 
that recreational uses of the Bay were underdeveloped and that its development could 
bring comparable, if not greater, potential for stabilizing the economy than could 
commercial fisherman.  Though many recreational boaters had made use of Bellingham 
Bay’s temporary boat moorages, only a small number of boats made Bellingham Bay 
their permanent harbor.  But this scenario was changing rapidly.  The Corps believed 
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there to be 164 locally based pleasure boats in 1946, up from 60 in 1938.169  The pleasure 
craft that had relocated amounted to an investment roughly estimated at half of a million 
dollars.  Furthermore, Elsethagen, who made these off-the-cuff financial approximations, 
expected an even greater investment in recreational craft if a proper small boat basin was 
constructed.  Elsethagen claimed that numerous Seattle yachtsman had approached the 
Bellingham Boat Owners Association and declared their intentions to move their vessels 
to Bellingham Bay once better facilities were made available.  Elsethagen summed up the 
economic benefits to the community of constructing a small boat basin for recreational 
boaters when he claimed that “one of the main things that is not completely developed or 
has not been overdeveloped lies in Bellingham’s surrounding waters,” and “certainly 
[recreational boating was] Bellingham’s potential development and future.”170  
Most attendees agreed that nurturing the recreational industry at Bellingham Bay 
was important for regional economic growth (unless they chose not to comment) but a 
few of the speakers gave the impression that shaping the Bay to meet these ends was a 
controversial notion and that many in the community would need to be convinced of the 
benefits of recreational boating.  According to Elsethagen, the problem that many in the 
community had with the recreational industry was that it did not fit into their framework 
of the most important function of the Bay: deep draft navigation.  Elsethagen claimed that 
most people in the community were holding onto an aging notion of what the term 
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navigation meant.  He stated that “when navigation is discussed…I imagine the average 
man thinks of ocean-going vessels, liners, steamers, just as in land transportation we 
think of railroads [and] mile-long freight trains.”  But Elsethagen went on to explain that 
this definition of navigation was too limited, and needed to be revised.  “However, there 
is a second function of navigation transportation,” he remarks, “On land we have 
commercial cars, commercial trucks, and we have pleasure cars; and on the waters we 
have commercial fishing craft and we have pleasure boats.”  Navigation had always been 
a central goal of improving the Bay, but according to Elsethagen and others, economic 
growth would not occur unless the term “navigation” was broadened and other uses of the 
Bay subsequently nurtured through improvements, namely for recreational and 
commercial fishing vessels.   
Elsethagen’s effort to expand the meaning of the word “navigation” was very 
crafty considering the power that the word conjured in the minds of Bellingham residents.  
It was a word that long summoned the prospects of economic growth.  Elsethagen may 
have been trying to equate pleasure boating with deep draft navigation because a 
significant portion of the community of Bellingham was averse to the idea of making the 
Bay conducive to recreational boaters.  Anderson explained this hesitancy best when he 
claimed that “If you go out in the county, many times you will find people saying we 
don’t believe in having boat facilities for recreation.”  Anderson suggests that they felt it 
to be a “secondary” industry—probably to the timber industry.  
These sentiments were beginning to change, however, and the developing 
recreational industries of Florida and California were, according to Anderson, responsible 
for changing sentiments.  According to him, these states had demonstrated to the rest of 
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the nation that the recreational industry was both profitable and long-lasting.  Anderson, 
as a result, declared to the audience that he “didn’t believe you can say that recreation is 
secondary to anything. It is tops.”  Mayor Howard seconded this belief when he reminded 
the attendees that City Hall had been convinced of the benefits a small boat basin would 
have on the fishing industry, only later to be convinced of the very important additional 
benefit to the region’s nascent recreational industry.171   
It is not clear whether or not Anderson represented accurately the views of the 
majority of the people of Whatcom County regarding the development of a small boat 
basin and, specifically, whether the community had truly changed their minds about the 
benefits of a recreational industry.  But a representative of the local labor organization 
who attended the meeting mentioned that his constituents supported the construction of 
the boat haven, giving some credence to Anderson’s claims that things were changing.  
Henry Biesheuvel of the Bellingham Central Labor Council explained to the attendees 
that his association favored the boat basin because “[o]rganized labor,” he declared, 
“believes one thing the working man needs is recreation.  This proposed boat haven, 
located handily, where our men could go out and have their small craft and be near to the 
fishing grounds, is very desirable.”  Furthermore, many in the organization, like 
Biesheuvel himself, had lost boats to storms, and were forced to berth their vessels in 
distant cities for protection.  
Although the labor council supported the small boat basin and intended to utilize 
it for recreational uses, the support does not add up to support for the development of the 
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recreational industry because the council did not support constructing a boat haven to
spur economic growth through the replacement of existing jobs.  They endorsed it 
because it would enhance the leisure time of existing types of labor.172
By the end of the meeting, support for the small-boat basin was clearly evident, 
though the original site of the small boat basin had still not been determined.  Most of the 
attendees had agreed that the basin should be constructed in Chuckanut Bay, a small 
secure cove contiguous to both the City and Bay of Bellingham.  The process of selecting 
the final location of the small boat basin also reveals how the Bay had taken on different 
meaning to the Corps and, especially, local residents—both of whom began to doubt the 
need for maintaining the Bay as a feature of nature that supported commerce first and 
foremost.       
One of the reasons for holding the public meeting was to convince the Great 
Northern Railway company to relinquish its railroad right-of-way to small vessels 
coming to and from the proposed boat haven.  This was an issue because the Great 
Northern had constructed a train trestle across Chuckanut Bay in 1902 (which was later
replaced with fill in 1920).  This trestle effectively cut the waterway off from Bellingham 
Bay.173  Unfortunately, the best site for the boat haven was within the trestle; all of the 
sites outside trestle would have been impossible to develop because of the unstable bay 
floor.174  The representative for the Great Northern in attendance refrained from 
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commenting on the proposal, but by the tone of the meeting it was evident that this was a 
huge request.  Thus, it was little surprise when the company later informed the Corps that 
it would not give up its right-of-way.175  They claimed that the necessary drawbridge 
would cost the company too much money to construct.  Furthermore, it would cause 
unavoidable delays and unnecessary risks.176
Although the planners of the small boat basin failed to gain the Great Northern’s 
support for a boat haven at Chuckanut Bay, their efforts were quite bold because they 
demonstrate that the community was willing to un-develop, ever so slightly, something 
that they had for years deemed absolutely necessary for economic growth: railroads.  This 
trend would continue as the community sought out a new location for a permanent small 
boat basin.  After the Great Northern announcement, the community set their eyes on the 
northeasterly portions of the harbor where many of the most dramatic changes to 
Bellingham Bay had occurred.  Originally, plans were made to further assist both deep 
and small draft navigation.  But, in the end, deep draft channels were undermined in favor 
of a small boat basin.  
Even before the public meeting was held, the demand for moorage was so great 
that the port commission was forced to develop parts of the northeasterly harbor that had 
been reengineered for commercial vessels.  By 1937, the port had been forced to alter a 
portion of Squalicum Creek Waterway for the temporary use of small boats.  This 
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facility, which was originally intended to help the commercial fishing fleet, quickly 
became overcrowded by recreational boats.  The needs of small boats was such that 
another portion of Squalicum Creek Waterway was redeveloped for the use of fishermen 
in 1946 and 1947.  While these temporary facilities helped alleviate moorage problems, 
the situation was so dire that the port commission was later forced to construct temporary 
facilities in a portion of Whatcom Creek Waterway—the principal deep draft channel in 
the harbor.  After plans for a small boat haven at Chuckanut Bay were abandoned, and 
the temporary moorage of South Bellingham was destroyed in a storm, the Squalicum 
Creek moorage was made permanent.177  
Although the proposals to re-make Squalicum Creek Waterway became a reality, 
there were alternatives available for the port.  While South Bellingham and Chuckanut 
Bay turned out to be poor places to construct a boat haven, the I & J Street Waterway was 
still largely undeveloped—aside from some minor dredgings completed by the Navy—
and could have alleviated the pressure that small boats had put on the other deep draft 
facilities.  The Port of Bellingham had even submitted a proposal to the Corps to develop 
this underutilized waterway into a dual use terminal to assist shallow and deep draft 
vessels.  
This waterway could have been made into a suitable boat basin had it not been for 
the opposition of pleasure boat owners—they objected to the plan because it meant that 
their boats would be too close to industrial operations for their comfort.  The decision to 
forgo development of the I & J Street Waterway further shows that recreational interests 
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had obtained (while commercial shippers had lost) a relative degree of power over the 
types of functions that they Bay should serve.178  The decision to improve Squalicum 
Creek Waterway instead of the I & J Street Waterway underscores the way that the Bay 
had changed in meaning for the people of Bellingham and the Corps.  The Bay was no 
longer a place where big ships were signifiers of the best use of marine nature.  As a 
result, plans to manipulate the Bay further for deep draft shipping, which the Port of 
Bellingham had greatly desired during the 1920s and 1930s, were abandoned and even 
reversed as small boat interests, most of which were recreational, demanded that the Bay 
serve their interests instead.
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Conclusion
It should be evident by now, that the underwater landscape was extremely important to 
the former residents of Bellingham Bay.  Indeed, on more than one occasion, it brought 
people into conflict as some sought to control and shape this unseen environment.  
But this type of conflict is far from being something unique to the Bay’s history.  
Present-day residents have continued to seek control over the Bay in order to embed their 
ideas of nature into the landscape.  Before closing, it is important that we look briefly at 
the ways that new ideas about nature are coming into conflict, and how the Bay is, and 
will continue to be, an environment that people try to control and embed with social 
meaning.  
Bellingham has become something of an Ecotopia in recent years, to borrow the 
title of a regionally popular fictional novel about the environmentally minded populace of 
Washington, Oregon and Northern California that seceded from the United States to form 
a state founded on ecological principles.179  For those who are unfamiliar with 
Bellingham, Washington, it would be difficult to overstate to them how “nature” and the 
“environment” have become more than words, more like city mottos.  According to one 
study, for instance, when describing their city, many residents typically point to the 
adjacent bay and mountains, and opportunities for outdoor activities in these as 
Bellingham’s most notable qualities.  This is interesting because its residents point to 
these as the most defining characteristics of the city before ever mentioning the important 
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historic buildings or popular urban cultural activities.180  Furthermore, countless 
descriptions of the community by national publications verify that the city’s surrounding 
nature is one of its most important characteristics.  Take for instance the following praise 
from an advertisement about great places to retire: “With Bellingham Bay to its west and 
snow-capped Mount Baker to the east, Bellingham is a city designed for nature 
lovers.”181  One might expect to find this type of description in portrayals of the city by 
the Sierra Club or the Audubon Society, but it was penned by the editors of the financial 
magazine Kiplinger.  In 2005, Kiplinger ranked Bellingham as one of the nation’s 
premier retirement destinations because of its nearness to prominent features of nature in 
the Pacific Northwest, such as Puget Sound and the Cascade Mountain Range.  That a 
national financial magazine with no ostensible outdoor recreational or environmental 
affiliation can recognize and tout the relationship between Bellingham and its 
surrounding natural environments underscores the importance of certain qualities of the 
environment as selling points, but also how wide and far the city’s reputation as a place 
to find them, has reached.  Praise from nature and outdoor recreational magazines like 
Outside further support this generalization.  In 2001, the magazine listed Bellingham as 
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one of its “Dream Towns” because of the community’s generally outdoorsy 
orientation.182
The Bay, despite its touting by Kiplinger and others, fails to live up to the newer 
meanings that have been given to the city and its surrounding natural environments.  This 
is because it is no longer a pristine feature of nature.  Therefore it does not correspond 
with the types of social meanings that people now place on it.  Consequently, its 
underwater landscape has once again become contested as many in the community have 
attempted to “restore” the Bay to a pre-contact state after years of environmental change 
caused, in part, by industrial producers.
This most recent conflict has resulted from the actions of Georgia-Pacific West 
Inc. (Georgia-Pacific).  In the last forty years, many residents and grassroots 
environmental groups, such as the Bellingham Bay Foundation, have grown increasingly 
angry with the way that the Bay has been treated by this company. Georgia-Pacific, 
which owned a pulp and tissue processing plant that closed in the last decade, was 
responsible for polluting the Bay with mercury during the 1960s and 1970s.  Mercury, a 
byproduct from their tissue bleaching process, and a potentially deadly chemical, has 
been pointed to by local environmentalists as a reason for the decline in the Bay’s marine 
life.  Since the original contaminations, many in the community have confronted the 
company and demanded that mercury laden sediments be removed from the Bay so that 
its waters can act as marine habitat again—particularly for young salmon.  Victories were 
won in the 1970s when the EPA required Georgia-Pacific to construct a waste water 
                                                
182. Mike Grudowski, “Dream Towns 2001: Welcome to Your New Backyard,” Outside Online, 
September, 2001. http://outside.away.com/outside/destinations/200109/200109towns_1.adp (accessed 
November 29, 2009). 
112
treatment facility at the waterfront to prevent additional contaminations.  Further victories 
seemed imminent when the city acquired the contaminated waterfront properties, as well 
as the responsibility for handling the mercury, from Georgia-Pacific in 2004.183
Rather than disappearing, the anger that many had towards Georgia-Pacific
shifted onto the City and Port of Bellingham.   To many, the city council and port 
commission are treating the Bay as carelessly as Georgia-Pacific by proposing that much 
of the contaminated sediments be “capped” with non-contaminated sediments instead of 
removed.  Calls for the total removal of mercury can be heard from grassroots 
environmental groups such as the People for a Healthy Bay.  Environmental groups, such 
as this one, have argued that the port and city are skimping on cleanup efforts and habitat 
restoration by capping so that they can help facilitate the construction of another small-
boat basin along the waterfront.  The port and city deny that their cleanup proposals are 
inadequate and that they are intentionally forgoing a more rigorous cleanup effort in 
order to help facilitate the construction of the basin that will bring in revenue.
However, environmentalists think that the Port and City of Bellingham are 
intentionally skimping, so they continue to advocate for the removal of mercury.  Those 
that desire the total removal started a petition in 2006.  The petition nearly resulted in a 
voter’s initiative that would have allowed city residents the power to demand that the 
largest amount of mercury possible be removed.  Though the initiative garnered double 
the necessary signatures to warrant a place on the ballot—suggesting that many, if not 
most of the community wanted most of the mercury removed—it was invalidated by the 
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county courts.  The judge ruled that the initiative lacked the qualities of a legally binding 
ordinance, which the State initiative process requires.  The attorney representing the port 
best summed up the reason the initiative was stricken: “While it’s seductive to say ‘Let’s 
let the people vote,’ this is a misuse of the initiative power,” since it would “turn the 
initiative into a public poll.”184  In spite of the decision, the mercury dilemma has 
remained a relatively hot topic in the community. 
The mercury dilemma provides an appropriate story on which to end this thesis 
because it is a dispute that shares commonalties with other disputes that occurred in the 
past.  At the core of the mercury conflict are the following questions: who should get to 
control the underwater landscape of the Bay?  And, for what purposes should it be used 
and physically altered?
Residents of Bellingham Bay have often had to confront and debate these 
questions, especially after the arrival of non-Natives.  Disagreements resulted because the 
“nature” of Bellingham Bay was not at all self-evident.  Some saw the harbor as a vital 
link in the chain connecting the two major coasts of the nation by rail.  Others saw it 
serving other purposes, like its role as a dump.  While these two different conceptions of 
nature did not necessarily conflict, other conceptions would.  This was especially the 
case when the Bay took on more specific meaning as place for deep draft navigation—
this conception of the Bay brought the Corps and mill companies into conflict.  Later, as 
recreational and agricultural interests came to obtain more power and support from the 
federal government, the different meanings of the Bay would collide yet again as 
                                                
184. John Stark, “Judge Throws Out Clean Bay Initiative,” Bellingham Herald, September 19, 
2006.
114
commercial interests were forced to hand control of the Bay over to the increasing 
number of small boat owners—primarily recreational boaters. 
Competing ideas about the Bay, which were at times mutually exclusive, 
inevitably led to a struggle for control of the harbor’s underwater landscape.  Congress 
was the first entity to exercise control over the Bay.  For much of the early part of the 
twentieth century, Congress regulated the uses of the Bay, chiefly through its agent, the 
Corps.  The rules that legislators instituted were simple: the only interaction with the Bay 
that they were critical of were those that inhibited navigation.  During the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, the Corps exercised their powers fully.  
But as the Corps relaxed its control over the Bay and turned its attention to flood 
control measures, a power vacuum appeared.  New ideas about the Bay emerged and 
gained strength, especially after environmental and social changes (i.e. sedimentation, 
decline of the timber industry) had taken place.  Recreational boating interests emerged 
as the strongest lobby with the most convincing plan for developing the Bay in the future.  
The Corps, which still nominally held control over the Bay, assented to this new vision.  
By allowing recreational interests to plan future Bay improvements, the Corps, in effect, 
surrendered its control of the underwater landscape.  Whether or not recreational boating 
interests are wagging the tail of the Port and City of Bellingham with reference to the 
present redevelopment scheme, these boaters have remained powerful actors over the 
years, especially when it comes to the present harbor redevelopment scheme.  
To conclude, this thesis has made a case that to understand the history of the City 
of Bellingham it is necessary to understand the underwater landscape of the Bay.  
Furthermore, marine coastal environments like it should be thought of as middle grounds 
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that need to be considered in isolation from, as well as in relation to, terrestrial and deep 
ocean environments.  My approach was to examine the ways in which this particular
underwater landscape was fought over and reshaped.  Marine environmental historians as 
well as urban historians could do no harm by peering under the surface of the water more 
often than they have in order to incorporate these sorts of dynamic environments into 
their interpretations.      
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